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Taxation of Electronic Gaming
Bryan T. Camp*
Abstract
At a doctrinal level, the subject of this Article is timely.
During this time of the coronavirus pandemic, casinos have
been closed and large populations have been subject to
stay-home orders from local and state authorities. One can
reasonably expect a large increase in electronic gaming and
thus an increased need for proper consideration of its taxation.
This Article argues for a cash-out rule of taxation.
At a deeper level, the subject of this Article is timeless. Tax
law is wickedly complex for a reason. This Article explores that
complexity using the example of electronic gaming. It grapples
with the source of that complexity: an inherent and
unresolvable tension between economic theories of income and
the practical needs of administering a system of taxation to a
large population in a democracy. That tension led some
scholars to argue for a standards-based approach to taxation.
This Article considers and rejects that argument. Legal rules
are necessary to mediate between theory and practice. Hence,
this Article demonstrates the continued relevance and
importance of doctrinal analysis in legal scholarship.

* Copyright 2020 by Bryan T. Camp. Camp is the George H. Mahon
Professor of Law at Texas Tech University School of Law. He thanks the
following folks for their many useful comments: Leandra Lederman, Ted
Seto, Bruce McGovern, and Susie Morse. Camp also thanks Charles Blevins
for his great help in understanding casino operations. Finally, Camp thanks
Texas Tech School of Law for funding this research. Any errors the reader
finds are likely due to Camp’s intransigence or incompetence, take your pick.
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I. Introduction
When I was young and full of quarters, I became an expert
at the video arcade game “Defender.” This was a game where
you manipulated your spaceship to save humanoids from being
abducted by aliens.1 Saving humanoids and destroying aliens
earned you points. You played until your spaceship was
destroyed (the aliens shot back). The game started with three
ships, and you won a new ship for each 10,000 points you
scored. Each ship thus represented a “unit of play.”2 How long
that unit of play lasted depended on luck and skill. Successful
players won more ships, and thus more “play” for their
quarter. After several months and massive numbers of
quarters, I reached the point where I could play for hours on a
single quarter, amassing forty to fifty ships before heading off
to lunch (or class) and letting others take over. I got a lot of
play for my money.
No one thought that the extra ships I won counted as
gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 61.3 To be sure, I would have
income if I had cashed out by selling the use of those virtual
ships to other players. But there was no need to even think
about taxes unless and until I engaged in a market transaction
trading the virtual units of play for cash.
Electronic gaming has moved far beyond the video arcades
of my misspent youth. Players now play, not for virtual lives,
but for virtual dollars that can, in some games, be redeemed
into real money. Some players play online games of skill,
wagering bets on the outcome. The gaming site takes a rake of
the virtual pot and the winners’ gaming account gets credited
for the rest, which they can either redeem for cash or use for
more play.

1. For a more complete description of the game, see Defender: Classic
Arcade Game Video, History & Game Play Overview, ARCADE CLASSICS,
https://perma.cc/8GQ9-Z6BY (last visited Jan. 23, 2020) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See id.(discussing the point rewards system for accomplishments in
Defender).
3. All references to statutes and sections in this paper are, unless
otherwise noted, to the Internal Revenue Code, codified as Title 26 of the
U.S. Code.
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Other players visit brick and mortar casinos but still
create electronic gaming accounts, receiving plastic Player
Cards with magnetic strips or microchips.4 The gaming
accounts not only track play (to determine comps) but also
keep a running account of each player’s gaming account
balance. When players win a pull at the slot machine, they do
not receive coins (although the machine makes all those
exciting sounds). They instead receive a credit on their gaming
account which they can either redeem for cash or use for more
play.
In both cases—the online gaming account or the casino
Player Card account—the electronic units of play come in the
form of game credits, similar to the “extra lives” I used to win.
Just as with Defender, successful players win more units of
play and thus play on their initial stakes longer than
unsuccessful players. Unlike my virtual ships, however, these
units of play are redeemable for cash. Casinos and website
owners are required, either by contract or law, to allow players
to cash out, at fixed rates of exchange. To the Internal Revenue
Service (the Service, or IRS) and to commentators, that
distinction makes all the difference: redeemable units of play
are gross income.5
The problem presented by redeemable game credits
presents a lovely opportunity to explore the interplay of tax
theory and tax practice. That exploration also illustrates the
importance of legal doctrine as a subject of academic study.
Legal doctrines mediate theory and practice. Getting the legal
rules right is important. In the case of redeemable game
credits, the wrong legal doctrine (the constructive receipt rule)
4. This Article does not directly address online poker sites such as
www.WSOP.com. As of March 2020, five states—Delaware, New Jersey,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia—permit online poker sites for
“real money.” This Article’s thesis and analysis, however, should apply
equally to such gaming sites. See Cliff Spiller, Is Online Poker Legal in the
USA?, US POKER SITES (Aug. 20, 2010) https://perma.cc/WY9F-GK2P (last
updated Jan. 6, 2020) (last visited Mar. 4, 2020) (noting state-by-state
legality of online poker) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-32-025 (May 3, 2005) (stating
that a casual game player has income on a per-game basis to the extent the
prize won in the game is greater than the entry fee); Theodore P. Seto, When
Is A Game Only A Game?: The Taxation Of Virtual Worlds, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
1027, 1043 (2009) (arguing that redeemable credits are gross income when
earned).
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creates practical and theoretical problems. The correct legal
doctrine (a cash-out rule) produces harmony between theory
and practice even though it does not fully reconcile one to the
other.
Part II presents the background necessary to understand
the difficulty current law has in dealing with redeemable game
credits. It explains the limitations of current guidance and
reviews the two approaches that the Service has taken towards
deciding how taxpayers must report income from gaming
activities: (1) a per-transaction approach; and (2) a per-session
approach.
Part III discusses the practical problems presented by
current doctrine. Those problems affect both taxpayers and
also tax administration.
Part IV discusses the theoretical problem: should
redeemable game credits count as gross income? The answer to
that question allows a deep exploration of how the legal
meaning of gross income is subject to competing economic and
accounting concepts, which have traditionally been reconciled
by the practicalities of tax administration in a democracy
through legal rules. Realization and imputed income are two
legal doctrines relevant to this issue that operationalize the
economic theory of income into an administrable legal regime.
Part V considers and rejects the idea that the legal concept
of income should be viewed as a standard, as Professors Abreu
and Greenstein have suggested.6 While I am in sympathy with
their underlying concern that legal doctrines not be enslaved
to economic theory, I believe redeemable gaming credits
illustrate how their idea risks giving too much weight to
operational considerations. Just as the theory of gross income
should be bounded by operational considerations, so should
operational considerations be bounded by theory. At bottom,
the legal definition of income should be neither purely
6.
See, e.g., Alice G. Abreu and Richard K. Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule:
A Better Way to Understand the Definition of Income, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 101,
104 (2012) [hereinafter It’s Not a Rule] (discussing the necessity of viewing
income as a standard to provide a flexible approach to unforeseen cases); see
also Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion from Income of Compensation for Service
and Pooling of Labor Occurring in a Noncommercial Setting, 11 FLA. TAX.
REV. 683, 697 (2011) (considering the exemption of income from
noncommercial activities from taxation).
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ontological nor purely opportunistic. One needs legal rules to
draw appropriate lines. Part VI concludes by explaining why a
cash-out rule is the appropriate rule to use in the taxation of
electronic gaming.
II. Two Facets of Electronic Gaming
“My problem lies in reconciling my gross habits with my
net income.”—Errol Flynn7
“I must have gone through $10 million during my career.
Part of the loot went for gambling, part for horses and part for
women. The rest I spent foolishly.”—George Raft8
The worldwide casual game market is a well-established
multi-billion dollar economic segment. The United States is the
second largest market, accounting for some $35.5 billion in
2018.9 In 2018, over 2.3 billion people worldwide were playing
casual games.10 They were spending an average of six hours
per week on their games.11
A significant part of the general casual game market
involves sites that allow players to accumulate redeemable
game credits, otherwise known as “real money” games.12 A
single such provider, Worldwinner.com, claims to have over 30
8. Errol Flynn, IMDB, https://perma.cc/9ZHU-W9V6 (last visited Jan.
8, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. George Raft, IMDB, https://perma.cc/Q6YZ-GQZ4 (last visited Jan.
8, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See Top 10 Countries/Markets by Game Revenues, NEWZOO, https://
perma.cc/VJZ6-84NX (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (providing information on
annual revenue generated by games for different countries) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See Tom Wijman, Newzoo’s 2018 Report: Insights Into the $137.9
Billion Global Games Market, NEWZOO, https://perma.cc/2G8W-XB9Q (last
visited Jan. 8, 2020) (highlighting the significant portion of the population
who play games) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See The State of Online Gaming 2018, LIMELIGHT NETWORKS, https://
perma.cc/84VV-2467 (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (detailing the amount of time
different subsets of gamers spent playing games each week) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Will Yakowicz, The Booming Business of Cash Prize Gaming,
INC.COM (May 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/MD6B-GVC9 (last visited Jan. 8,
2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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million users worldwide.13 Independent analytics show an
average of 1.5 million visits to Worldwinner per month in 2018
from United States users.14 Another real money gaming
website is Skillz.com.15 In 2018, Skillz.com, claimed to have 18
million users who played tournaments for cash prizes.16
Fantasy sports sites attracted some 59 million players in
2017.17 A market research company put the annual revenue in
2019 at over $8 billion.18
Casino play dwarfs casual online gaming. Planes, trains,
and buses shepherd flocks of players through casino doors
daily, most of whom play for the sheer fun of it. In 2018, the
UNLV Center for Gaming Research reported that casinos
sheared over $47.8 billion from players.19
While casual online gaming differs dramatically from
casino play for some purposes—notably for laws governing
gambling—these two forms of recreation are very similar for
13. See WorldWinner and PopCap Expand Relationship, GAMES INDUS.
(Dec. 3, 2007), https://perma.cc/4BZH-RHHY (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See WorldWinner.com Traffic Overview, SIMILARWEB, https://
perma.cc/U2LE-EM44 (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
15. See Scott Rayburn, Skillz Brings Real-Money Gaming to the U.S.,
ADWEEK (Apr. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/PPK7-JUB6 (last visited Jan. 8,
2020) (describing Skillz.com as a “first-of-its-kind” platform) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Annie Pei, Skillz Hands Out over Half a Million Dollars in
Prizes Every Day to Mobile Gamers. Here’s What That Means for the Future
of Esports, CNBC (Nov. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/EG2C-LRXR (last visited
Jan. 8, 2020) (finding that players of Skillz’s games “collectively earn over
$675,000 in prizes on average”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
17. See Industry Demographics, FANTASY SPORTS & GAMING ASS’N,
https://perma.cc/9LGC-YYH2 (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (illustrating the
widespread popularity of fantasy sports games in North America) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See Fantasy Sports Services Industry in the US—Market Research
Report, IBIS WORLD (Dec. 2018), https://perma.cc/ZC5E-UKJ5 (last visited
Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See United States Commercial Casino Gaming: Monthly Revenues,
U. NEV. LAS VEGAS (Dec. 2019), https://perma.cc/GFV7-KK8F (last visited
Jan. 8, 2020) (summarizing the revenue generated by each state from casino
play) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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tax purposes. This Part will (A) describe each type of gaming,
and (B) explain the current tax treatment for losses and gains.
A. Games of Skill
There are multiple opportunities to waste time playing
online casual games. Some opportunities also involve wasting
money. This Article will focus on www.Worldwinner.com.
Players join Worldwinner by creating a player account and
agreeing to a Terms of Service (TOS) agreement.20
The basic player account is free and allows access to many
entertaining games. These include traditional real world
games like Hearts, Spades, and Hangman, as well as games
created solely for online play, such as Scrabble Cubes, a
combination of Boggle and Scrabble. Players may upgrade an
account by paying a minimum fee of $10 to Worldwinner
(using either a credit card or Paypal). Worldwinner then
credits the player’s account with ten play dollars, which I shall
symbolize as P$.21 In addition, Worldwinner has various
upgrade incentives where it will credit a player’s account with
additional P$, depending on how much the player initially
deposits.
Players with upgraded accounts can choose to play a wider
variety of games at a wider variety of levels and they are
allowed more robust interaction with other players. More
importantly, however, they can enter tournaments where they
compete against other players to see who can score the highest

20. See WorldWinner Terms and Conditions, WORLDWINNER (Aug. 5,
2019), https://perma.cc/L4WW-DGB5 (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (specifying
how one officially becomes a player on WorldWinner’s platform) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See id. Casual Game operators like to promote the idea that game
credits are “real money” because they can be redeemed for U.S. dollars. For
example, in email correspondence with the author, Worldwinner accounting
employees took the position that the credits in the player account are real
dollars. That is also the position the company took in its PLR (private letter
ruling) request and it is an unstated assumption in the PLR. I explain below
the defects in that assumption. Other operators, however, have fun with the
idea of virtual currency. I especially like the banana unit of play. See Earn
Bananas, Bananatic, https://perma.cc/UL9Q-EU2L (last visited Jan. 8, 2020)
(using bananas as a currency in gameplay) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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on a given game at a given level of difficulty.22 In most games,
the players do not compete directly against each other but
instead play a game against the computer, with each player’s
game being of purportedly equal difficulty.
For example, a player might enter a three-person Scrabble
Cubes tournament for P$2.50. Each player plays a full game of
Scrabble Cubes against the computer. Although the players do
not play the exact same Scrabble Cube configuration,
Worldwinner attempts to make each Scrabble Cube of equal
difficulty. Worldwinner debits P$2.50 from each player’s
account and then credits the winning player’s account P$6.00.
The other P$1.50 represents Worldwinner’s “rake” in that it
represents an amount that can never be cashed out.23 With
some exceptions, Worldwinner allows players to cash out their
P$ at any time at a fixed exchange rate of 1US$ per 1P$,
subject to various limitations.24 A player account thus
fluctuates as the player wins or loses tournaments. If the
online player account balance reaches zero, a player must buy
more P$ in order to be able to enter tournaments (i.e. bet on
play).
22. See Playing for Cash 101, GSN GAMES, https://perma.cc/GSG8-GY82
(last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (promoting the benefits of upgrading Worldwinner
accounts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Players with
upgraded accounts can choose to bet on any number of games, either
traditional games like Spades, Hearts, and Backgammon, or games created
especially for online play, such as puzzle games like Scrabble Cubes, strategy
games like Dynomite, or sports games like 8-ball pool.
23. See About Compete for Cash, WORLDWINNER, https://perma.cc/C3QZP7NK (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (stating the rules for competing for cash on
Worldwinner platforms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). I
use these figures solely to illustrate the concept. Worldwinner regularly
changes the scope and cost of the competitions and has different rate and
rake structures for different games. Notice the rake is a huge percentage of
the pot, much larger than online casinos charge. For example, as of the date
of my example, August 5, 2014, the biggest bet allowed in Scrabble Cubes
was a P$50 buy-in to enter a four-person tournament. With a P$175 total
payout to the winners, that meant the site operator was taking in a
twenty-five percent rake. Smaller pot games had even larger rakes. In “Deal
Or No Deal,” on that same day, the largest bet permitted was P$1.85 to enter
a five-player game. Of the resulting P$9.15 in play, the site operator paid out
a total of P$6.50, keeping almost thirty percent. Yes, these rakes are in P$
but that takes those amounts off the redemption table.
24. See infra Part VI.
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In addition, Worldwinner gives out loyalty awards to
players who spend sufficient amounts of money on games.
Cash game players accrue “reward points” which can be
redeemed for gift cards to stores (e.g. Walmart) or extra game
credits. Neither reward points nor game credits can be
redeemed for cash. Worldwinner tracks all activity and players
can at any time see what their balances are. Here is an
example of how Worldwinner presents the information. In the
example, the player has a total of P$23.98, composed of $11.20
in redeemable credits (which Worldwinner labels “Real
Money”) and $12.78 in unredeemable credits (which
Worldwinner labels “Game Credits”).

B. Gambling
Back when I was dropping quarters into “Defender” many
people were dropping quarters into the slot machines in
Nevada and New Jersey, then the only two places where casino
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gambling was legal.25 By 1995, legal gambling was “a
multi-billion-dollar industry that has proliferated across the
country.”26 By then the industry had matured to the point
where casinos created a national trade organization called The
American Gaming Association (AGA).27
By far the most popular activity in casinos is slot machine
play.28 A 2010 study found that “a significant majority of
gamblers say slot machines are their favorite games to play,
and the slot machine’s share of the gaming floor at American
casinos has grown from about 40 percent in the 1970s to
almost 70 percent today.”29
Industry terminology divides slot machines into two types:
Class II and Class III.30 Class II games are connected to a
25. See FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING IN
THE GAMING INDUSTRY 2 (2012) (discussing the status of legal gambling in the

1960s and 1970s).
26. Libutti v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2343 (1996).
27. See How We Deliver, AM. GAMING ASS’N, https://perma.cc
/CY2A-WEAL (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (describing the mission and purpose
of the AGA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See generally Kah-Wee Lee, Containment and Virtualization: Slot
Technology and the Remaking of the Casino Industry, CTR. FOR GAMING RES.
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES: PAPER 14 1, 3 (2012); Cristina Turdean,
Computerizing Chance: The Digitization of the Slot Machine (1960–1984),
CTR. FOR GAMING RES. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES: PAPER 15 1, 1 (2012).
29. David Stewart, Demystifying Slot Machines and Their Impact in the
United States, AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION WHITE PAPER 1 (July 2010).
See also MICHAELA D. PLATZER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44680, INTERNET
GAMBLING: POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2016).
30. See, e.g., Slot Machines by Country, WIKIPEDIA, https://perma.cc
/9SUX-U284 (last updated Oct. 16, 2019) (last visited Jan. 9, 2020)
(discussing the difference in game characteristics between different classes of
slot machines) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
definition of slot machines for interstate commerce regulation purposes in 15
U.S.C. § 1701 (2018), however, makes no attempt to create classes of
machines. And the classification created by the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA), Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988), which applies only to
Indian casino operations, creates classifications of types of games, not just
slot machines. Still, the Class II and Class III games described in the IGRA
do have a rough correspondence to the different types of slot machines.
Professor Kevin Washburn explains the connection in Agency Conflict and
Culture: Federal Implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act by the
National Indian Gaming Commission, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the
Department of Justice, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 303, 316 (2010). When IGRA was
enacted, it divided profitable forms of gaming into two categories: Class II

672

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 (2020)

centralized computer system that is programmed to deliver a
set amount of prizes within a set amount of pulls, or bets. In
this way, Class II slots operate like scratch-off lottery tickets:
each machine has an equal chance of winning a series of
limited prizes and there are set numbers of tickets issued.
After the set amount of pulls is reached, the system resets. As
with scratch-off tickets, there are no repeated combinations.
Once a pull is used up, it won’t repeat until the system resets.
Thus, one game is dependent on previous games. A previous
loss uses up one of the pre-set losses and a previous win uses
up one of the pre-set wins. This arrangement essentially
makes players compete against each other for a common prize.
There may or may not be any player skill element in this kind
of machine. Video poker machines are a typical example of
Class II machines.
Class III machines—sometimes referred to as “Vegas style
slots” are the stereotypical machines. They operate
independently from a centralized computer system and from
each other. Each has a random number generator and is
programed to pay out only when a certain number is hit on the
pull. Thus, a player’s chance of winning any payout is the same
with every play because the winning number’s chance of
occurring remains unaffected by previous pulls. Each game is
independent of any previous games.
Both classes of slot machines come in three flavors: coin,
token, and electronic. Coin slots operate by the player dropping
a coin (or coins) into the machine and pulling the handle or the
tab. If the machine pays out, it returns the payout in coins.
Token machines work similarly, with players inserting tokens
that they buy at the casino cage. If the machine wins, it pays

games, such as bingo and pull-tabs; and Class III games, which is a residual
category including all other forms of gaming. Importantly, Congress
indicated that bingo is a Class II game “whether or not electronic, computer,
or other technological aids are used in connection therewith.” IGRA § 4, 102
Stat. at 2468. However, Class II gaming explicitly does not include
“electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot
machines of any kind.” Id. at 2469. Therefore, such devices necessarily fall
into Class III. Because of the fluidity of the terms used and because of the
very nature of technology, the line between a Class II “electronic, computer,
or other technological aid” to bingo and a Class III “electronic or
electromechanical facsimile or slot machine of any kind” is not crystal clear.
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out tokens, which, as with casino chips, players must take to
the cage to convert to money.
Electronic machines are also known as “cashless” because
players use loadable player cards to play. That is, players have
long been able to sign up for Player Accounts, which the
Casinos use to monitor play and give “comps” to those who
play enough.31 Computer technology has enhanced Casinos’
ability to track play and, since about 2005, Casinos have given
players the option of plastic cards with a magnetic strip across
the back that have the look and feel of a traditional credit
card.32
A player loads money into their Player Account at a cage
or self-service kiosk.33 The player uses the card by inserting it
into the slot machine and entering a security PIN that allows
the machine to access the account and load account balance
information into the machine. When the player is done at that
machine, the player presses a button to end play and the
machine transfers the play data back to the Player Account.
The player can then remove the card and go to another slot
machine, or perhaps a table game. When the player is ready to
cash out, the player must return to the cage or a self-service
terminal to convert the account balance into cash or refunds to
a credit card.

31. For an excellent and detailed description of how casinos tracked
players in the pre-electronic card days, see Barbiero v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M.
(CCH) 59, 61 (1992).
32. For an interesting history of player tracking systems, see Carolan
Pepin, Player Tracking: You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby, GLOBAL GAMING
BUS. MAG. (June 6, 2011), https://perma.cc/8H3Z-F6RF (last visited Jan. 9,
2020) (“Player tracking now stands as one of the most powerful applications
of the overall casino system.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). As with other aspects of Casino operations, player cards and player
accounts are heavily regulated. For example, Casinos may be required to
create secure systems, protect player data, disclose the terms and conditions
of the player accounts to players, etc. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 543.17 (2020)
(stating the minimum internal control system regulations for patron deposit
accounts and cashless systems).
33. This paragraph is drawn from personal observation and from
promotional materials distributed by a manufacturer of casino player card
systems. See, e.g., Overview, ADVANSYS, https://perma.cc/B6XS-U8W6 (last
visited Jan. 9, 2020) (explaining how the card software operates) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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III. Current Doctrine: Knowns and Unknowns

It’s complicated. Taxation requires proper treatment of
income items and deduction items. The law is clear on the
treatment of deduction items for gaming costs, but is unclear
on the treatment of income from gaming. This Article’s thesis
is that proper taxation requires the proper netting alignment
of income to costs. In the area of gaming, current doctrine
creates a misalignment. Let’s look at how and why.
A. The Alice and Myra Hypotheticals
To illustrate current doctrine, to explain its problems, and
to propose solutions, I will draw upon two hypothetical players,
Alice and Myra. Each spends $20 to have fun and uses up that
$20.
Alice opens a player account with Worldwinner and uses a
credit card to put in P$20 and upgrade her status. Pursuant to
an incentive, Worldwinner adds P$20 to her account. It thus
shows her account as divided between P$20 “real money” (i.e.
redeemable credits) and P$20 “game credits” (i.e.
non-redeemable credits). Both types of game credits can be
used equally to enter tournaments, but players may not choose
which group is used. Instead, Worldwinner programming uses
up each group pro-rata. In addition, Alice’s play earns her
loyalty points which she can redeem for various comps, such as
gift cards.
Assume Alice plays a series of three-person Scrabble
Cubes games over some period, putting up P$2.50 each time
for a prize of P$6.00. If Alice wins every third game (for a net
loss of P$1.50) her account balance will drop to P$2.00 after
she plays (and loses) her sixty-eighth tournament. At that
point she will no longer be able to enter any P$2.50
tournaments.34 Over the course of play, however, Alice will
have won twenty-two games for a total of P$132 in cumulative
winnings, which cost her P$55 in entry fees. She will have
34. She will have lost P$1.50 for every set of three tournaments. At the
end of her 22nd set of three tournaments (66th game) she will have a balance
of P$7.00, good enough to enter and lose two more tournaments, leaving her
with P$2. Essentially, Alice will have gotten sixty-eight “plays” for her $20. If
she won the first of every set of three games she would get seventy-six plays
and have P$1 after the 76th game.
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spent an additional P$115 in entry fees for her forty-six losing
tournaments. Thus, her entry fees total P$170.35 Yet she walks
away $18 poorer.
Myra opens a Player Account at a Casino, call it the Rose
Garden Casino. She obtains a “Flower Power” player card
which allows her to accumulate loyalty points and associated
comps, such as gift cards. Myra uses a credit card to put P$20
on her player account. Pursuant to an incentive program, Rose
Garden Casino adds P$20 to her account. Assume Myra uses
the card to play the slots over some period, betting P$2.50 on
every pull. Assume the same facts as Alice: by the end of the
period Myra has won P$6.00 on every third pull and thus, after
her sixty-eighth pull, Myra’s player card has only P$2.00 on it.
During course of play, her twenty-two winning pulls brought
total winnings of P$132, which cost her P$55 in bets. In
addition, Myra spent an additional P$115 in bets on her
forty-six losing pulls. Thus, just like Alice, Myra’s bets total
P$170.36 And, just like Alice, Myra has lost $18.
B. Gaming Deductions: Me nem nesa37
To understand the problem presented as to whether
redeemable game credits constitute gross income, the reader
must first understand the applicable tax rules to gaming
deductions—including deductions for gaming losses and for
other expenses (such as travel costs, entry fees, etc.). The
deduction rules are known. We should start with them to
properly understand the true practical stakes of the income
question.
35. In addition, by the time she has run her original $20 down to
P$2.00, Alice has accumulated 340 loyalty points. The tax consequences of
these loyalty points are beyond the scope of this Article. However, I will note
that they are operationally like any other type of loyalty program, which
means they will likely be viewed as a reduction of Alice’s cost rather than an
accretion of income.
36. Like Alice, Myra will also have accumulated loyalty points and, as
with Alice, the tax consequences of loyalty points are beyond the scope of this
Article.
37. Dothraki for “It is known.” See Dothraki, GAME OF THRONES WIKI,
https://perma.cc/DZ7F-5UV7 (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (providing
translations for common English phrases in Dothraki) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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1. What Is Allowed

Congress generally permits taxpayers to deduct from their
income the money it takes to produce that income. One sees
this general policy at work in the concept of Cost of Goods Sold
(COGS) found in § 471, in the § 162 rules for trade or business
deductions, in the § 165 rules for losses and in the hobby loss
rules in § 183. There is no principled distinction between
netting expenses against gross receipts to arrive at gross
income and netting expenses against gross income to arrive at
net income: all reflect a Congressional choice to tax income net
of associated costs.38
Section 471 permits taxpayers to account for inventory
costs by reducing their gross receipts for goods sold by an
amount reflecting the cost of the goods sold. The rules are
complex but the statute explicitly recognizes they may be
“necessary in order clearly to determine the income of any
taxpayer.”39
Section 162 permits deductions for the ordinary expenses
needed to carry on a trade or business. For businesses that sell
goods, these deductions apply only to the income calculated by
subtracting COGS from gross receipts. Section 212 permits
similar deductions for activities engaged in “for the production
of income” but which are not a trade or business.40 Section 183
permits similar deductions for the ordinary expenses of
producing income, even when the income results from a hobby
and not from a trade or business. The effect of all three
deduction sections is that Congress taxes only net income from
the qualified income-producing activity.
Thus, the income subject to the income tax is not just the
raw gross receipts a taxpayer receives. It is instead that gross

38. For a lovely explanation of the deep theory, see Joseph Dodge, The
Netting of Costs Against Income Receipts (Including Damage Recoveries)
Produced by Such Costs, Without Barring Congress from Disallowing Such
Costs, 27 VA. TAX REV. 297, 299 (2007) (advocating a computational netting
approach to the treatment of contingent attorney’s fees).
39. § 471(a).
40. § 212(1). For a good explanation, see Surasky v. United States, 325
F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1963) (discussing deductible items under Section
212).
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number reduced by certain associated costs.41 It may also
result from capitalization of other costs, creating basis. Basis is
then netted against either future income (through
depreciation) or ultimate disposition.42
Section 165 reflects a Congressional decision that losses
should be treated the same as other ordinary expenses. Thus,
165(a) permits deductions to losses “sustained during the
taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise.” Congress limits the deductions as to individual
taxpayers, however, in subsection (c), which permits
deductions only for those losses “incurred in a trade or
business” of an individual or those losses an individual incurs
“in any transaction entered into for profit, though not
connected with a trade or business.” Thus, losses from one
income-producing activity may generally be netted against
profits from a different income producing activity.
Congress forbids taxpayers from deducting losses arising
from a taxpayer’s hobby activity. Hobbies are personal
consumption and § 262 creates a general rule disallowing the
deduction of the costs of personal consumption. Section 183
trumps that restriction, however, and allows taxpayers to
deduct expenses of a hobby against any income produced by
the hobby, but only up to the total amount of income produced
by the hobby activity.
Taxpayers have never been allowed to deduct “hobby
losses” (i.e. when expenses exceed income) against other
sources of income. When Congress codified this idea in 1969, it

41. Congress sometimes chooses to allow less netting. For example,
§ 280E prohibits deductions and credits for any trade or business activity
that “consists of trafficking in controlled substances . . . which is prohibited
by Federal law . . . engaged in the production of drugs.” Although such
businesses are allowed the COGS netting, they are denied the § 162 netting.
That caused some taxpayers to complain that taxation of marijuana
dispensaries went beyond Congress’s constitutional powers. The Tax Court
rejected that argument in N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants Inc. v. Comm’r, 153
T.C. No. 4 (Oct. 23, 2019). See Bryan Camp, Lesson from the Tax Court:
280E Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment, TAXPROF BLOG (Oct. 28, 2019)
https://perma.cc/4BTG-SHXG (last visited Mar. 4, 2020) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. See Dodge, supra note 38.
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had long been the rule applied by the Service with judicial
blessing.43 It is known.
Section 165(d) creates a limitation similar to § 183 for a
certain class of losses: “losses from wagering transactions.” The
good news here is that Congress has permitted deductions for
these types of losses, regardless of whether or not the wagering
activity is the taxpayer’s business. Whether a taxpayer is
engaged in gaming for pleasure or profit, as a business or as a
hobby, § 165(d) allows a deduction for “losses from wagering
transactions.” So even though a wager itself is not the kind of
expense allowed by either § 162 or § 183, the loss of that wager
is a loss deduction permitted by § 165(d). That is good news
indeed.
The bad news, however, is that § 165(d) limits the
deductions of “losses from wagering transactions” to the
amount of “gains from such transactions.” That is so even if
the losses would otherwise be permitted by subsections (a) and
(c).44 Thus, so far as the question “what is allowed” goes,
taxpayers who are in the trade or business of gambling get the
same treatment for wagering loss deductions as taxpayers who
are hobbyists.45

43. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 213, 83 Stat. 487,
571–72 (explaining and defining permissible deductions). See generally
Michelle B. O’Conner, The Primary Profit Objective Test: An Unworkable
Standard?, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 491, 498–99 (1996)
Thus, § 183 operates as an allowance provision authorizing
limited deductions with respect to an activity that does not fall
within the classification of a “trade or business.” In this way,
section 183 represents a continuation of judicial doctrine and
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) policy permitting taxpayers to
deduct certain expenses incurred in connection with an activity
that did not constitute a “trade or business.” (citations omitted).
44. Humphrey v. Comm’r, 162 F.2d 853, 855 (1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 817 (1947) (holding that wagering losses were a separate class of
expenditures deductible under the special rule in § 165(d) and so were not
deductible under § 162(a) or the general rules of § 165).
45. This is even more true after 2017, when Congress expanded the
definition of “losses from wagering transactions” to include “any deduction
otherwise allowable under this chapter incurred in carrying on any wagering
transaction.” § 165(d) (2018). That language was added by § 11050(a) of the
legislation commonly called the Tax Cut and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97,
131 Stat. 2054, 2087 (2017).
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2. Where Taken: Above vs. Below the Line
Determining “what is allowed” does not complete the
deduction analysis for many taxpayers. If the deductions
permitted by § 165(d) are attributable to the taxpayer’s trade
or business, then § 62(a)(1) directs those deductions to be
taken from gross income to determine the adjusted gross
income (AGI) line on a return. We call those “above the line”
deductions. However, if § 165(d) deductions are attributable to
a hobby or to a § 212(1) activity for production of income, then
§ 62 does not direct them to be taken above the line. The
deductions are instead subtracted from AGI to determine
taxable income. We call those “below the line” deductions.
The rules allowing trade or business deductions to go
above the line while requiring hobby deductions to go below
the line create two unhappy consequences for taxpayers whose
electronic gaming activity is not a trade or business but is
instead a hobby. Taken together, the consequences produce a
significant violation of the principle that taxpayers with
similar incomes should be taxed similarly.
The first consequence comes in what I call a fight between
the standard deduction and the § 165(d) deduction. The
standard deduction was an innovation created due to Word
War II (WWII). Generally, a taxpayer must prove entitlement
to each item of deduction claimed on the return.46 That was
uniformly true for all deductions up until WWII when
Congress extended the income tax to the great mass of middle
income taxpayers.47 Recognizing that the new income
provisions would now apply to ordinary folks who may not
46. See Indopco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (“[A]n income
tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and . . . the burden of clearly
showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.” (citation
omitted)).
47. See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78–315, 58 Stat.
231; see also Carolyn C. Jones, From Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of
Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37
BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686 (1988) (stating that the WWII legislation dramatically
increased the number of taxpayers from seven million to forty-two million);
Alan L. Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts in the Individual Income Tax, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 429, 433–34 (1983) (“When the number of households
covered by returns is considered, the coverage of the tax system was
extended from about 5% to 74% of the population.”).
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keep needed records, the tax writers made simplification a
chief goal of their legislative efforts.48 As part of this effort,
Congress created the standard deduction, giving taxpayers a
standard amount they could deduct, without having to prove
anything or keep records.49
The problem occurs when taxpayers must choose between
itemizing their below-the-line deductions and taking the
standard deduction. Taxpayers would much prefer to take
their itemized deductions plus the standard deduction. They
would prefer to take all the deductions that they can prove
above the line rather than be forced to choose between the
itemized or the standard deductions. Taxpayers whose
electronic gaming activity is their trade or business get the
best of both worlds: their § 165(d) deductions go above the line
plus they can take the standard deduction. Their § 165(d)
deductions do not fight against the standard deduction.
Hobbyist taxpayers, however, have to fight the standard
deduction. Allowed deductions for hobby activities are not
listed in § 62 and so are taken below the line.50
As applied to gaming activity that is considered gambling,
that means the gains from wagering transactions must all be
included as part of gross income, but the associated loss
deductions are separated and taken later (if at all) below the

48. See H.R. REP. NO. 78–1365, at 1 (1944).
49. See Feld, supra note 47, at 439 (“Using the standard deduction, a
taxpayer computed his tax from a table of income and dependency levels, so
that a taxpayer whose only income consisted of compensation could file a
return with minimal computation.”).
50. The argument that gambling losses should be allowed above the line
is strong: unlike most personal expenses, such losses directly relate to the
production of income. Most of the expenses allowed to be taken above the line
are those that relate to activities that produce income items, whether the
activity is a trade or business or a non-business activity such as rental of real
estate. That makes AGI function as a proper measure of the taxpayer’s net
profit for the year and, hence, ability to pay the imposed tax. In contrast, the
expenses allowed below the line are, generally, those that relate to personal
expense that Congress allows for policy reasons unrelated to the
measurement of net profit. Given that § 165(d) disallows taxpayers the
benefit of deducting net wagering losses against other income, the § 165(d)
deduction looks much more like a deduction for a cost incurred in producing
income rather than a personal cost.
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line, as an itemized deduction.51 This placement of the
deduction below the line makes it very difficult to truly offset
gaming winnings because it must first fight with the standard
deduction.52 This inability to directly offset gaming income
with gaming losses distorts the hobbyist’s income.53
For example, say a taxpayer engaged in electronic
gambling activity in 2019 as a hobby. The standard deduction
for a person filing singly in 2019 was $12,200.54 If the taxpayer
had wagering gains of $8,000 and wagering losses of $16,000,
§ 165(d) would permit deduction of the losses up to $8,000.
However, § 62 would send that deduction below the line where
it would fight with, and lose to, the standard deduction,
assuming other itemized deductions were no greater than
$4,200. For this taxpayer it is as if there were no deduction
allowed for wagering losses.
If the taxpayer’s gaming was not gambling, the situation is
worse, at least through 2025. That is because the $16,000 in
losses would be deductible as § 183 hobby expenses and not as
§ 165(d) gambling losses. That makes them subject to the rules
in § 67. Section 67(a) gives a general rule that miscellaneous
itemized deductions may only be deducted to the extent that
they aggregate to more than two percent of a taxpayer’s AGI.
Section 67(b) defines the term “miscellaneous itemized
deductions” as being all itemized deductions not listed in
§ 67(b).55 Hobby expenses are not listed in § 67(b). Thus,
traditionally, § 67(a) would only permit so much of the $8,000
51. See Lamb v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1882, 1886 (2013) (noting
that an itemized deduction is allowable for wagering losses in certain
circumstances).
52. See Christine Manolakas, Taxation of Gamblers: The House Always
Wins, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 553, 594–95 (2018) (stating that “the gambler
effectively cannot deduct gambling losses and, thereby, offset gambling wins”
when competing with the standard deduction).
53. For a real-life example, see Viso v. Comm’r, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 178,
179–80 (2017) (explaining that a taxpayer who had to report over $5,000 in
slot machine wins was unable to deduct corresponding losses because $5,000
was less than the applicable standard deduction for joint return filers).
54. Rev. Proc. 2018-57, 2018-49 I.R.B. 827.
55. See Whitten v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064, 1067 (1995) (“[W]e
conclude that wagering losses must be accounted for and reported separately
from the expenses incurred by the taxpayer . . . .”).
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that exceeded two percent of AGI to qualify for deduction.
That amount would then be capped by the § 183 hobby loss
rules. For tax years 2018 through 2024, however, Congress has
prohibited any deduction at all for miscellaneous itemized
deductions.56
The second unhappy consequence for being forced to take
deductions below the line is the effect on AGI. Congress ties a
variety of tax benefits to AGI which it uses as a proxy for
ability to pay.57 As AGI goes up, tax benefits go down,
reflecting a policy that higher income taxpayers have less need
for the given tax benefits than lower income taxpayers.58 For
example, § 68 reduces the amount of itemizable deductions
when an individual’s AGI exceeds $250,000. Similarly, a
taxpayer’s AGI will affect eligibility for a variety of tax credits
with such credits being reduced as the taxpayer AGI rises and,
ultimately, denied when the AGI rises above certain cut-offs.59
By separating income from deductions, the law thus distorts
the true ability to pay.
Together, these two consequences diminish horizontal
equity.60 Consider what happens if the taxpayer’s gaming
activity is a trade or business and not a hobby. While both
§ 183 and § 165(d) ostensibly operate to deny losses by limiting
deductions to the amount of income, § 62 now permits this
deduction to be taken above the line, directly against wagering
gains. Thus, the business taxpayer’s AGI will be $8,000 less
than the hobbyist taxpayer, even though they both have the

56. § 67(g).
57. See Mark J. Cowan, Assignment of Income at the Ivory Tower:
Relaxing the Tax Treatment of Services Donated to Charities by Their
Employees, 40 J.C. & U.L. 1, 38 (2014) (“The government uses AGI to gauge a
taxpayer’s income level for purposes of limiting tax benefits . . . .”).
58. See Vada Walters Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the Internal
Revenue Code: The Need for Renewed Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 42
(2001) (arguing for increased tax benefits to lower income taxpayers to
restore progressivity in the federal income tax system).
59. See, e.g., § 21(a)(2) (limiting household and dependent care service
credit); § 23(b) (limiting adoption credit); § 24(b) (limiting child credit);
§ 25A(d) (limiting “Hope” and “Lifetime Learning” credits).
60. See Ira K. Lindsay, Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of
Horizontal Equity, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 79, 80–81 (2016) (defining horizontal
equity as the principle that individuals with identical tax bases should pay
the same in taxes).
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same items of income and items of deduction. Additionally, the
lower AGI may entitle the business taxpayer to tax benefits
denied to the hobbyist.61
Being in the trade of gambling helps align the expenses of
the activity with the income the activity produces.62 In addition
to taking wagering losses above the line, professional gamblers
have been allowed to deduct the other ordinary and necessary
expenses allowed by § 162 in addition to their wagering loss
deductions.63 While Congress has now disallowed such
deductions, that disallowance sunsets in 2025.64
3. Application to Alice and Myra Hypotheticals
Alice and Myra both put $20 of U.S. currency into play. At
the end of the play they have lost $18, having only $2 still in
their electronic account. Interstitially, however, they have each
won P$132 in redeemable game credits, at a cost of P$170 in
total bets. If we assume, for the moment, that those
61. This violation of horizontal equity is reduced when both taxpayers
have non-§ 165(d) below-the-line deductions that exceed the standard
deduction amount. See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1462 (2018) (discussing the standard deduction’s
effect on horizontal equity). But, the inequality remains because their AGIs
will still be different. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
62. See Manolakas, supra note 52, at 589–90 (noting that because
professional gamblers are able to deduct net gambling losses, the tax code
treats these expenses like other business-related losses).
63. See Generic Legal Advice Memo (GLAM) 2008-013 Professional
Gambler’s Wagering Losses and Business Expenses (Dec. 10, 2008) (collecting
cases and arguing for a consistent litigating position that does not read
§ 165(d) as preventing deductions otherwise allowed by §162). Interestingly,
the Office of Chief Counsel group that wrote the GLAM appears to have had
no influence when the exact same issue arose in litigation. See Mayo v.
Comm’r, 136 T.C. 81, 96–97 (2011). There the government argued for exactly
the opposite position than the one set out in the GLAM. The Tax Court,
however, sided with the taxpayers, essentially adopting the GLAM position,
albeit with no mention of the GLAM. See id. at 97 (holding that the
petitioner was entitled to deduct his business expenses related to
professional gambling under § 162(a)).
64. Section 165(d) currently reads: “in the case of taxable years
beginning after December 31, 2017, and before January 1, 2026, the term
‘losses from wagering transactions’ includes any deduction otherwise
allowable under this chapter incurred in carrying on any wagering
transaction.”
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redeemable game credits constitute gross income, then the
standard analysis will turn on whether their gaming activity is
a trade or business or a hobby.
If their gaming is a business, then the answer is a happy
one. They will be able to deduct their § 165(d) losses above the
line. In addition, after 2025, they can also take other § 162
deductions above the line, even if the deductions exceed the
amount of income from their gaming activity.65
In fact, if both Alice and Myra engage in gaming activity
as a business, Alice might be better off than Myra because
while Myra is engaged in wagering, Alice may be engaged in a
skills-based activity, at least according to the analysis in
private letter ruling (PLR) 2005-32-025.66 That means her
losses are non-wagering losses and not subject to the
restrictions on § 165(d). She could deduct the total of her
gaming losses and her other business expenses against her
gaming wins. The key analytical move here would be that Alice
does not have any gains or losses from “wagering transactions”
because the games are based more on skill than luck. So, all
deductions become § 162 deductions and are not limited.
It is not clear how much weight the PLR analysis will
carry. On the one hand, it addressed a gaming website owner’s
reporting requirements and so did not directly interpret the
phrase “losses from wagering transactions” in § 165(d). Early
tax decisions held that betting on bridge was “wagering,” and
it is difficult to say that bridge is much different than the
65. Cf. § 165(d) (limiting deductions under this provision to the amount
of wagering gains). Because these deductions under § 162(a) are separate
from those taken under § 165(d), they can be greater than the amount of
wagering gains.
66. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-32-025 (May 3, 2005) (providing
guidance for recording income from online gaming tournaments). The idea
that Worldwinner games are skill-based is how Worldwinner gets around the
anti-gambling laws of most states, as does its start-up competitor, Skillz. See
Will Yakowicz, The Booming Business of Cash Prize Gaming, INC.COM (May
28, 2014), https://perma.cc/PX5F-H9VP (last visited Jan. 2, 2020) (describing
the legal team built by Skillz to advise them on laws related to their platform
in various states) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Benny
Evangelista, Skillz Lets Game Players Win Real Money, SFGATE.COM (May
28, 2014, 4:02 AM), https://perma.cc/T3JM-MW6J (last visited Jan. 2, 2020)
(explaining that Skillz provides way other than casino-style games for
individuals to win money) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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games played on Worldwinner.67 Current tax decisions hold
that wins and losses in tournament poker are “wagering
transactions.”68
On the other hand, the basic rule in most jurisdictions is
that activities are not gambling activities when skill
predominates over luck.69 Hence, what may look like wagering
becomes simply “investing.” Worldwinner takes great pains to
explain that it ranks players by skill and only allows players to
compete against others of the same skill level.70 Further some
state courts decisions do treat poker and similar games as
games of skill.71 Finally, the legislative history to § 165(d)
suggests that the term “losses from wagering transactions”
was intended to apply to traditional types of gambling, like
roulette, slots, and pull-tabs, which are of a far different
character than word games or poker.72
Putting both hands together, it is possible, if not likely,
that Alice may escape the rule in § 165(d) and deduct, without
67. See Heide v. Comm’r, 2 B.T.A. 451, 452 (1925) (deciding that playing
bridge for stakes is wagering).
68. See, e.g., Tschetschot v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 914, 916 (2007)
(“[I]t is clear that while there are differences between tournament poker and
other types of poker, none rise to the level of meaningful, substantive
differences that would warrant different tax treatment under the current
Internal Revenue Code.”).
69. See Josh Chumley, Comment, Follow the Yellow Chip Road: The
Path to Legalizing Internet Poker, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 547, 558–60 (2012)
(explaining the “dominant factor test” which is used in most jurisdictions to
determine whether an activity is one of skill or luck).
70. See Yakowicz, supra note 66 (noting the CEO of Worldwinner, in an
interview, stressed the importance of having players of similar skill compete
against one another by analogizing the unfairness of pairing him against
Tiger Woods in golf).
71. See George Remennik, Note, Mrs. Tschetschot’s Busted Hand, Poker,
and Taxes: The Inconsistent Application of Tax Laws on a Game of Skill, 8
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 485, 494–96 (2010) (collecting state court
cases).
72. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 22 (1934); 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 554, 570
Existing law does not limit the deduction of losses from gambling
transactions where such transactions are legal. Under the
interpretation of the courts, illegal gambling losses can only be
taken to the extent of the gains on such transactions. A similar
limitation on losses from legalized gambling is provided for in the
bill.
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restriction, all losses from gaming activity, if it is a business
activity. She will be lucky to have her skill recognized.
If Alice and Myra are hobbyists, however, the news is
grim. Myra will still be able to deduct losses from slot machine
play, but will have to deduct them below the line and may only
deduct her “losses from wagering transactions” to the extent of
her “gains from such transactions.”73 This means Myra’s AGI
will be inflated, with the variety of unpleasant consequences
detailed above.
If both are hobbyists, Alice now might even fare worse if
her Worldwinner activity is deemed not to be wagering
transactions. First, the answer to the question “what is
allowed?” will be the same as Myra. While § 165(d) will not
apply, she will be subject to the same limitation, courtesy of
the hobby loss rules in § 183.74 Second, however, the answer to
the question “where does it go?” will be much different. Now
her gaming losses will be treated as miscellaneous itemized
expenses subject to the two percent floor, with the consequence
that she will not be able to deduct any of her hobby expenses
for tax years 2018–2025, courtesy of § 67(g).
If we assume that redeemable game credits constitute
gross income, we then know the tax consequences because the
treatment of the expenses associated with that income are
known.75 The interesting question, however, is why and when
do redeemable game credits count as “gross income” within the
definition of that term in § 61? The answer to that is not
known.

73. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-10 (1960) (stating wagering losses are
limited to wagering gains regardless of whether the activity is a business or
non-business); Spencer v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2006-95, 2006 WL
1755510, at *2 (2006) (finding losses from hobby gambling must be taken
below the line). A silver lining here is that the term “gains from wagering
transactions” includes comps. See Libutti v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2343,
2347 (1996) (concluding taxpayer was allowed to deduct gambling losses
against fancy car and vacation comps).
74. See Boneparte v. Comm’r, 114 T.C.M. 381, 384 (2017) (determining
that Boneparte’s non-wagering gambling expenses fell into § 183(b)(2)).
75. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-32-025, at 6 (May 3, 2005) (finding
that $600 or more of gaming credits constitute income).
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C. Gaming Income: It Is Not Known
Current law is unclear about why redeemable game
credits constitute gaming income in the first place. There is a
dearth of case law and IRS guidance. In Boneparte v.
Commissioner,76 Judge Morrison gives a seemingly
straightforward explanation of gaming gains and losses in the
context of a gambling case:
A wagering transaction results in a gain if the winning
exceeds the cost of the wager. A wagering transaction
results in a loss if the cost of the wager exceeds the
winning. The gains for all wagering transactions for which
there is a gain are totaled. These are the gains from
wagering transactions within the meaning of section
65(d).77

In a footnote, however, Judge Morrison notes that the
amount of a wagering gain is not the gross amount of the
winning, but is instead that amount net of the bet:
Calculating the gain from each wager by subtracting the
cost of the wager is consistent with the holdings in cases in
which the Court, drawing an analogy between wagering
winnings and the recovery of a capital investment, has held
that a casual gambler’s gross income from a wagering
transaction should be calculated by subtracting the bets
placed to produce the winnings, not as a deduction in
calculating adjusted gross income or taxable income, but as
a preliminary computation in determining gross income.78

Judge Morrison thus believes that some netting is
proper.79 The problem of calculating the gains, however, is
deciding the scope of the netting. What amounts should count
in Judge Morrison’s “preliminary computation?”
Existing guidance gives two answers to that question: the
per-transaction method and the per-session method.80 This
Part examines how each of those methods might apply to our
76. 114 T.C.M. 381 (2017).
77. Id. at 383 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 388 n.3.
79. Id. at 388.
80. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-32-025, at 6 (May 3, 2005)
(exemplifying the per-transaction method); CCA 2008-11, at 4 (Dec. 5, 2008)
(exemplifying the per-session method).
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two taxpayers, Alice and Myra. It is this Article’s thesis that
both methods are wrong.
1. The Per-Transaction Method
Alice and Myra might have to report the redeemable game
credits arising from each winning transaction as income (less
the fee or wager made to win). Each would thus report $77
income ($6.00 won in each of the 22 winning transactions less
the $2.50 bet). They would then account for the $115 in losses
by deducting those losses per § 165(d), taking those losses
either above the line (if their gaming activity is a business) or
below the line (if it is a hobby). This is the idea in Judge
Morrison’s Boneparte opinion. It is supported by both IRS
guidance on a related topic, and academic commentary.
First, IRS guidance comes in PLR 2005-32-025, which
addressed the question of how a gaming website operator
indistinguishable from Worldwinner must fulfill its obligations
under § 6041.81 Section 6041(a) requires all persons engaged in
a trade or business “making payment in the course of such
trade or business to another person . . . of $600 or more in any
taxable year” to report those payments to the Service.
Treasury Regulation 1.6041-1(a)(2) requires the reports be
made on Form 1099. Treasury Regulation 1.6041-1(g) extends
the reporting requirement to “any payment . . . made in
property other than money,” in which case the payor must
report the fair market value of the property as the amount of
the payment.
Worldwinner sought guidance on how it should calculate
winnings to determine when it had paid a player more than
$600.82 It offered the Service a choice of three methods: a
method with no netting, a method with a per-transaction

81. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-32-025 (holding that a casual game
site operator must report as “payments” online credits made to the
taxpayer’s gaming account, when credits performed same function as casino
chips and the taxpayer had not yet cashed out). The PLR was actually in
response to a request from Worldwinner. Although the PLR does not mention
Worldwinner by name, company employees confirmed the identity to me in
telephone conversations.
82. See id. at 1 (referring to the requirement in § 6041 of the Code).
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netting, and method with yearly netting.83 The Service answer
was “per-transaction.”84 Its description mirrors Judge
Morrison’s approach in Boneparte:
In Taxpayer’s situation, prizes are made possible by a
player having paid the entry fee to that tournament.
Therefore, when the player wins a prize by successfully
competing in one of Taxpayer’s sponsored tournaments, the
entry fee to that tournament is a return of capital.
Therefore, the amount of the prize includible in gross
income is the prize amount net of the fee. Accordingly, only
such net amounts are considered income for purposes of
section 6041.
Entry fees for tournaments where a player does not receive
a prize, however, are not a return of capital, and cannot be
subtracted by Taxpayer when determining the income paid
to a player. Although it is possible that individual players
may be entitled to deduct on their respective returns entry
fees they paid to Taxpayer, the Code requires the individual
players to report all of their income and take all applicable
deductions on their individual tax returns. There is no
authority allowing Taxpayer to effectively take a deduction
on behalf of a player by reporting the net amount to the
Service on a Form 1099.85

One might ask how a PLR addressed to reporting
obligation under § 6041 relates to the issue of whether
redeemable game credits are income. The answer is § 74. The
applicable regulation requires Worldwinner to report if it made
payments of “prizes and awards that are required to be
included in gross income under § 74.”86 Section 74(a), in turn,
explicitly provides that the term “gross income includes
amounts received as prizes.” Accordingly, if redeemable game
credits count towards the $600 reporting limit because they
are “prizes” within the meaning of § 74, that means they must
be income to the taxpayer as the PLR itself implicitly
acknowledges in the quote given above. Importantly, like all
83. See id. at 2–3. The PLR describes these as the “gross method,” “net
method” and “cumulative net method.” What it terms “net method” is what I
term “per-transaction method.”
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(d) (2017) (emphasis added).
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other income, prizes can be in the form of cash, property, or
services.87
Second, academic commentary uses the doctrine of
constructive receipt to support a per-transaction approach.
Generally, cash method taxpayers must report only that
income which they actually receive during the yearly
accounting period.88 The doctrine of constructive receipt is an
exception to that general rule. Treasury Regulation 1.451-2(a)
provides that even if a taxpayer has not actually received some
item of income, it will be “constructively received by him in the
taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set
apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may
draw upon it at any time.” Similar regulations have existed
since at least 1918.89 The thrust of the doctrine is that if a
taxpayer (1) has a right to money and (2) the payor was ready,
willing, and able to make the payment, then (3) the taxpayer
must report that amount as income because the failure to
receive the money is simply the exercise of the taxpayer’s own
control.90 In contrast, “income is not constructively received if
the taxpayer’s control of its receipt is subject to substantial
limitations or restrictions.”91
The most comprehensive academic commentary on
redeemable game credits comes from Professor Ted Seto, who
created the helpful taxonomy of redeemable and

87. Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a)(2) (1960).
88. See § 451(a) (“The amount of any item of gross income shall be
included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the
taxpayer . . . .” (emphasis added)).
89. See Adams v. Comm’r, 20 B.T.A. 243, 245 (1930) (discussing
constructive receipt in Treasury Regulations dating back to the Revenue Act
of 1918).
90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
91. Id. This language would arguably give Alice (but not Myra), at least,
a peg on which to argue that the game credits are not income to her until
actually cashed out because Worldwinner charges $1.75 to extract any
amount below P$10.00 (per the Terms of Service § 2.16), even in the form of
a credit back to a credit card. Since, according to the PLR’s per-transaction
analysis, each P$6.00 credited to Alice’s account for a win represents a
return of $2.50 capital and income of $3.50, then, at least in the scenario
posited in the text, she is never winning more than P$10.00 at one time. Of
course, the real reason Alice will not cash out is that she wants to keep
playing.
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nonredeemable game credits in the first place.92 He concluded
that the constructive receipt doctrine supports, if not indeed
mandates, the per-transaction method for redeemable game
credits earned by players like Alice and Myra:
In general, amounts credited to players’ accounts in
worlds with redeemable currencies or game credits are
constructively received when credited if, as a practical
matter, the players can “draw upon [them] at any time.”
Whether “substantial limitations or restrictions” exist is a
practical question, not one to be resolved by hyper-technical
analysis of a world’s terms and conditions.93

2. The Per-Session Method
Alice and Myra might be able to report their redeemable
game credits in a different way. If we treat the $20 adventure
as a discrete event over a specified time period—call it a
session—they might be able to net out all their gains and
losses from that event. That would mean that instead of
reporting $77 income above the line, they would report zero
income. Although the PLR rejected the notion that
Worldwinner could simply net gross game credits won against
total bets over the year, the Service has adopted an alternative
position for taxpayers, first through internal guidance issued
by the Office of Chief Counsel, and more recently in formal
guidance that reacts to court opinions. The position is called
the per-session method. I will first explain the internal
guidance, then the court cases and conclude with the
regulation.
Internal memos, whether from one Chief Counsel office to
another or from one Chief Counsel office to an IRS office, are
meant for internal use but are publicly available thanks to
§ 6110 and persistent litigation by Tax Analysts, Inc.94 Over
92. See Seto, supra note 5, at 1042–48 (discussing redeemable versus
nonredeemable game credits).
93. Id. at 1049 (alteration in original).
94. See § 6110 (requiring memos to be made publicly available). Tax
Analysts is a non-profit organization that has sued the government multiple
times to secure the release of “secret” law in the form of internal memoranda.
See History of Tax Analysts, TAX ANALYSTS, http://perma.cc/Z4AH-TAGW
(last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (providing background on the organization) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

692

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 (2020)

time, these memos have carried a wide variety of labels. At one
time, memos designed to be generally circulated on a widely
encountered legal issue were denominated General Counsel
Memorandums (GCM). Later such memos came to be known as
“Chief Counsel Advice” (CCA). However denominated, Chief
Counsel memos are given unique identifying numbers that
represent the year and document number. Thus, CCA 2008-11
(“Reporting of Wagering Gains and Losses”) was the eleventh
such memo published in 2008.95
In CCA 2008-11, the Office of Chief Counsel considered
how a casual casino gambler should track and report income
and losses from slot machine play. The CCA considered a
hypothetical taxpayer who made discrete visits to casinos and,
on each visit, bought $100 worth of slot machine tokens, and
then redeemed the tokens (if she had any left) at the end of
each visit. The CCA took the position that the taxpayer should
calculate “losses from wagering transactions” and “gains from
such transactions” by netting out her wins and losses from
each session. For example, “a casual gambler who enters a
casino with $100 and loses the entire amount after playing the
slot machines has a wagering loss of $100, even though the
casual gambler may have had winning spins of $1,000 and
losing spins of $1,100 during the course of play.”96 Thus,
players look to see whether they have income only when the
total wins from a single playing “session” exceeded their total
losses.
The heart of the CCA’s analysis was the observation that
the word “transactions” in § 165(d) was plural, not singular:
A key question in interpreting § 165(d) is the significance of
the term “transactions.” The statute refers to gains and
losses in terms of wagering transactions. Some would
contend that transaction means every single play in a game
of chance or every wager made. Under that reading, a
taxpayer would have to calculate the gain or loss on every
transaction separately and treat every play or wager as a
taxable event. The gambler would also have to trace and
95. It was published on December 5, 2008. Concurrently, a different
type of guidance document, Chief Counsel Generic Legal Advice Memo
(GLAM) was published as GLAM 2008-13 (Dec. 10, 2008). The GLAM dealt
with a professional gambler’s ability to deduct non-wagering business
expenses.
96. CCA 2008-11 (2008) at 5.
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recompute the basis through all transactions to calculate
the result of each play or wager. Courts considering that
reading have found it unduly burdensome and
unreasonable. Moreover, the statute uses the plural term
“transactions” implying that gain or loss may be calculated
over a series of separate plays or wagers.
The better view is that a casual gambler, such as the
taxpayer who plays the slot machines, recognizes a
wagering gain or loss at the time she redeems her tokens.
We think that the fluctuating wins and losses left in play
are not accessions to wealth until the taxpayer redeems her
tokens and can definitively calculate the amount above or
below basis (the wager) realized. 97

The Tax Court adopted the CCA’s reasoning in
Shollenberger v. Commissioner.98 There, the taxpayers had one
really lucky visit to a casino, hitting a $2,000 slot machine
jackpot. The taxpayers had taken $500 to the casino and, after
hitting the jackpot, proceeded to continue playing until they
had $1,600 left. They then quit and went home.
On audit, the Service, using only the $2,000 winnings
reported by the casino on Form W-2G, dinged the taxpayers for
$2,000 in unreported income. This would be close to the right
result under the per-transaction method outlined in PLR
2005-30-025, except that the taxpayers would not have to
report as income the return of the amount they bet to win the
$2,000 jackpot. It may well be that the Revenue Agents used
that method. The omission of $2,000 income was, at least, the
basis for the deficiency notice.99
Tax Court Judge Michael Thornton rejected the
per-transaction approach and adopted the per-session method
outlined in CCA 2008-11:
Applying this methodology, respondent concedes that if we
find, as we have found, that on March 29, 2005, petitioners
entered the casino with $500 and took home $1,600 of
winnings, the amount of gambling income which petitioners
should have reported on their 2005 return was $1,100. 100

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 4–5.
98 T.C.M. (CCH) 667 (2009).
Id. at 668.
Id.
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The Tax Court, however, rejected any broader concept of
netting. The taxpayers had also proved up an additional
$2,264 in other losses from wagering transactions during the
tax year. They argued that they should be able to net these
losses against the jackpot earnings. Judge Thornton rejected
that argument:
Insofar as petitioners mean to suggest that section 165(d)
permits their gross income from slot machine play to be
calculated by netting all their 2005 slot machine gains and
losses, we disagree . . . . To permit a casual gambler to net
all wagering gains or losses throughout the year would
intrude upon, if not defeat or render superfluous, the
careful statutory arrangement that allows deduction of
casual gambling losses, if at all, only as itemized
deductions, subject to the limitations of section 165(d). 101

In addition to Tax Court, other federal courts have
adopted the per-session method. In Park v. Commissioner,102
the D.C. Circuit rejected the Service’s attempt to apply the
per-transaction method to non-resident aliens.103 Writing for
the court was then-Judge Kavanaugh. He relied upon the
reasoning in CCA 2008-11 to hold that the Service had to apply
the per-session position it had adopted there to all taxpayers,
domestic and foreign.104
The Service formalized a version of the “per-session”
approach in Notice 2015-21, which proposed a Revenue
Procedure (to date unwritten) that would allow taxpayers to
use a per-session approach as a safe harbor method for
determining wagering gains from electronic slot machine
play.105 Just as the Service’s guidance to Worldwinner on its
reporting obligations had implications for the question of when
redeemable credits must be accounted for as income, so does
the Notice likewise have implications for casinos’ reporting
101. Id. at 669.
102. 722 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
103. Id. at 387.
104. See id. (“On the question actually before us—the meaning of
‘gains’— we are persuaded that the per-session approach and not the per-bet
approach is the better approach for the reasons the IRS itself persuasively
explained with respect to U.S. citizens [in CCA 2008-11].”). For some reason,
Judge Kavanaugh mis-cited the CCA as “AM2008-11.” Id. at 386. Don’t
judge. IRS internal guidance nomenclature is ever-changing.
105. I.R.S. Notice 2015-21, 2015-12 I.R.B. 765.
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obligations. Thus, on the same day it issued Notice 2015-21,
the Service proposed modifications to Treasury Regulation
§ 1.6041-1(a) to conform a casino’s reporting requirement to
the Notice’s safe harbor method.106 That regulation was
finalized in 2016.107
What is not known here is how the concept of session
contained in the Notice and Regulations will apply to
redeemable game credits. Our hypothetical players Alice and
Myra simply do not have an identifiable “session” like the
Shollenbergers or the Parks did. My hypothetical did not say
whether Alice and Myra played all their sixty-eight games in
one day or one week or one month. That is because an
electronic account does not necessarily get redeemed as do
casino chips and tokens at the end of a single playing session.
Instead, an electronic account is continuous. Thus, both Alice
and Myra might have played their sixty-eight games over any
time period. And, of course, both might have added money to
their player accounts during one day and then carried
whatever balance was on the player account forward into a
different day or week or month.
The proposed IRS position, however, is that a “session” is
at most one calendar day.108 It is difficult to see the logic to
that conclusion. In contrast, one can easily see the logic of
Professor Seto’s argument to support a per-transaction
approach. Consider Myra and her casino play. If Myra were
dropping $2.50 in quarters into the slot machine and winning
$6.00 in solid, tangible, quarters, that would be actual cash
money. No one would doubt that Myra has received income. If
Myra chose to scoop up the $6.00 in quarters and pop them
right back into the slots, well, that was her choice on how to
106. See Information Returns; Winnings from Bingo, Keno, and Slot
Machines, 80 Fed. Reg. 11,600, 11,600–11,607 (Mar. 4, 2015) (to be codified
at Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-10) (amending Title 26 of the Code of Federal
Regulations to reflect the safe harbor provision).
107. See Information Returns; Winnings from Bingo, Keno, and Slot
Machines, 81 Fed. Reg. 96,374, 96,374 (Dec. 30, 2016) (to be codified at
Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-10) (final regulation).
108. See I.R.S. Notice 2015-21, 2015-12 I.R.B. 765 (“A session of play is
always determined with reference to a calendar day (24-hour period from
12:00 a.m. through 11:59 p.m.) and ends no later than the end of that
calendar day.”).
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use her income. The per-transaction logic is that the receipt of
the prize in the form of a credit to her player account ought to
make no difference because she has it completely within his
control to take the $6.00 in quarters by taking the player card
to the cage and withdrawing the $6.00.
Similarly, Alice’s win of $6.00 in redeemable game credits
looks like income because it is, literally, “credited to [her]
account.”109 While the Worldwinner Terms of Service charges a
$1.75 fee to redeem amounts of less than $10, Professor Seto
puts that aside as being a “hyper-technical analysis.”110
Instead he sticks with the theory that Alice can redeem the
$6.00 and so should be held to have constructively received
that amount net of the wager.111
Thus, as of this writing, it is not clear whether the
per-session or the per-transaction approach will predominate.
The next two sections explore how both approaches impose
practical costs on the administration of tax and undermine the
current legal conception of income.
IV. Current Doctrine Is Problematic in Practice
Notice 2015-21’s definition of session is not consistent with
CCA 2008-11 or with Shollenberger. Neither outcome turned
on the taxpayer entering and exiting the Casino on a single
day. The idea was a single session. For example, the
Shollenbergers could have entered the casino at 10 p.m. on
March 29th with $500 and then exited at 2 a.m. on March 30th
with the $1,600 and there is no indication that would have
changed the result. Yet Example 2 of the Notice suggests that,
like some fairy tale, the stroke of midnight separates

109. Terms of Service, WORLDWINNER, https://perma.cc/XR8A-ZKPQ (last
updated Aug. 5, 2019) (last visited Jan. 6, 2019) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
110. Seto, supra note 5, at 1049.
111. See id. (advocating for the per-transaction method which would
account Alice’s $6.00 when she constructively received it). I suspect Professor
Seto would agree to let Alice net out a deemed $1.75 cost to the deemed
redemption. If one does that and then also allows Alice to net out the P$2.50
wager, then the deemed income drops from $6.00 to $1.75.
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sessions.112 It would change the Shollenberger result when a
taxpayer physically enters the casino on one day and
physically leaves on another. The final regulation on
information reporting abandons midnight as the inviolate
magic hour and instead permits casinos to create a twenty-four
hour gaming day for their reporting convenience.113 But it
keeps the rule that a session cannot last longer than
twenty-four hours.114 When one has an electronic gaming
account, such a rule is arbitrary.
This current state of tax rules is problematic for taxpayers
and tax administration when it comes to taxing electronic
gaming. Both the per-session approach (with “session” defined
as a day) and the per-transaction approach create practical
problems. The problems for taxpayers, discussed above, come
about because of the separation of income items from the costs
associated with producing the income items. Those problems
for taxpayers, however, also create problems for tax
administration because taxpayers feel pressure to game the
tax system.
One quickly sees the game gamers must play. They can
avoid below-the-line deductions only if they make their gaming
activity a business and not a hobby. And any activity can be a
“trade or business” if the taxpayer pursues it with sufficient
regularity and with the objective of making a profit.115 The
§ 183 regulations set out a non-directive multi-factor test to
determine whether a taxpayer is so genuinely engaged in an
activity that it crosses the line from hobby to business.116 That
112. See I.R.S. Notice 2015-21, 2015-12 I.R.B. 765 (providing an example
in which play that all occurred in one trip would be divided into two sessions
because half occurred after 11:59 p.m.).
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-10(b)(2) (“An information reporting period
is a 24-hour period.”).
114. Id.
115. See Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987) (finding that an
unemployed marketer who spent an entire year at dog tracks, winning
$70,000 and losing $72,000, was engaged in the business of gambling).
116. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b). Those factors include: manner in which
the activity is carried out, expertise of the taxpayer, time and effort
expended in carrying out the activity, expectation of assets used
appreciating, success of the taxpayer in carrying out the activity, taxpayer’s
history of income or losses with respect to the activity, amount of profits

698

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 (2020)

means that a taxpayer’s chances of being found to be engaged
in a hobby or a business depends, to a non-trivial degree, on
the luck of the draw: luck in avoiding audit in the first place,
luck in drawing a sympathetic Revenue Agent, and luck in
drawing a sympathetic judge or jury.
Hobbyists try hard to win the game and be put in the
“trade or business” box. This has led, for example, to cases
finding that slot-machine gambling is a trade or business.117
Further, because taxpayers may simultaneously engage in
multiple businesses, courts have at times found wage-earners
to also be professional gamblers, entitled to treat their gaming
activity as a trade or business.118
Losing the game has serious consequences, as illustrated
by Shollenberger.119 There, a couple claimed that their slot
machine activity was a business and so took their losses above
the line. They claimed only the standard deduction below the
line. The Tax Court held their slot machine activity to be a
hobby and not a business and so denied the claimed deduction
for wagering losses.120 That left them unable to use their slot
machine losses because they could not undo their election to

earned, taxpayer’s financial status, and elements of personal pleasure or
recreation. Id.
117. See, e.g., Chow v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1193, 1196 (2010) (“This
is a close case . . . . We conclude, however, that petitioner was a professional
gambler during 2004 and 2005 . . . .” ); Le v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op.
2010-94, 2010 WL 2813420, at *3 (2010) (“We find petitioner’s gambling
activity was a trade or business that was pursued in good faith, with
regularity, and for the production of income . . . .”); Myers v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2007-194, 2007 WL 4117442, at *7 (2007) (“[W]e conclude that
petitioner engaged in the gambling activity with the actual and honest
objective of making a profit in 2003.”).
118. See, e.g., Myers, 2007 WL 4117442, at *7 (concluding that a taxpayer
who owned and operated a truck stop in Reno was also in the trade or
business of professional slot machine gambling); Barrish v. Comm’r, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 115, 119 (1984) (holding that a practicing attorney was also in
the trade or business of a “greyhound racing wagerer”).
119. See Shollenberger v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 667, 668–69 (2009)
(finding petitioners were not in the business of gambling and therefore had
$1,100 in unreported income for the year of 2005).
120. See id. (“Because petitioners were not engaged in the trade or
business of gambling, their gambling losses are allowable only as itemized
deductions.”).
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use the standard deduction.121 The result was they could take
no deduction for their slot machine losses.122
Thus, the current state of the law puts pressure on
taxpayers to think up ways to move gaming losses above the
line in order to achieve what intuition says is a proper
reflection of income. That pressure causes taxpayers to
characterize their gaming activity as a trade or business on
their returns, regardless of the facts. Websites even target
such taxpayers with promises to help hobbyists disguise
themselves as businesspeople.123
One practical problem this pressure creates is less tax
revenue.124 Taxpayer mischaracterization of a hobby as a
business can only be uncovered by personal audits.125 The
current audit rate is only about 1 in 200 returns.126 The audit
lottery leads less scrupulous taxpayers to simply lie and

121. See id. at 669 (finding that the limitations period had elapsed).
122. Id. See also Le, 2010 WL 2813420, at *3. In Le the taxpayers had
interstitial slot machine winnings of over $800,000 and losses of over $1
million. Id. at *1. Reporting the activity as a business, the taxpayers took the
losses above the line and so reported no net income. Id. On audit the Service
decided the taxpayers’ activity was not a business, thus forcing them to take
the losses below the line. Id. at *2. The massive increase in their AGI
resulted in the application of § 68 restrictions on certain personal deductions.
Id.
123. See, e.g., Colin M. Codym, Looking for Tax Deductions?
PROFESSIONALGAMBLERSTATUS.COM,
https://perma.cc/P2HH-KAYJ
(last
updated Nov. 9, 2019) (last visited Jan. 6, 2020)
Professional Gambler Status until recently has been rarely seen
on federal income tax returns, because frankly there were very
few people who earned their living traveling from casino to casino.
But with the onsurge of online gaming, the number of IRS filed
tax returns showing Professional Gambler Status is expected to
increase dramatically over the coming years.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. See Zoe Prebble & John Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 693, 725 (2010) (explaining the impact tax avoidance and
fraud have on tax revenue).
125. Cf. Jay A. Soled, Implications of Discovering Unreported Income,
Improper Deductions, and Hidden Assets upon a Taxpayer’s Death, 44 GA. L.
REV. 697, 721–22 (2010) (discussing how audits uncover improper
deductions).
126. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA
BOOK, 2018, Table 9a (showing an overall audit rate of 0.5%).
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uncertain taxpayers to try and stretch the truth, leaving
honest taxpayers sucker-punched.127 That is not good tax
administration.
A second practical problem this pressure creates is
disproportionate use of resources. It requires determination of
whether a taxpayer’s gaming activity is a business or a hobby.
As with decisions about intent in the gift exclusion area, such a
determination about motivation is messy, based on “life in all
its fullness” and “the mainsprings of human conduct.”128
Reading the various cases cited in this Article leaves one with
the firm and definite impression that both the Service and
courts use up a lot of resources to decide the business or hobby
question. Yet, those resources do not produce much tax
revenue. Consider again the case of Le v. Commissioner129 in
which the taxpayers churned over $1.8 million in slot machine
wins and losses. The audit resulted in a tax deficiency of
$10,000. That may be a lot for many taxpayers, but it is very
little for the government. How little? Well, it is likely below the
threshold for the government to pursue tax collection by
lawsuit.130
A third practical problem is that courts sometimes confuse
the “business” of playing slot machines with addiction. For
example, in Myers v. Commissioner,131 the taxpayer ran her
truck stop business from the time she woke until 1 or 2 p.m.,
then she would go play slots in the casino until between 2 a.m.
and 6 a.m.132 She would then return home and sleep a little
before getting up to run the truck stop. She started this
127. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive
Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 193
(1996) (noting how often taxpayers who play the audit lottery do not face
penalties).
128. See Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960) (discussing the
difficulties in determining motive).
129. T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-94, 2010 WL 2813420 (2010).
130. One finds the limit in the Service’s Law Enforcement Manual
(LEM), which is not a public document, but contains many such informal
policies. See, e.g., Church of Scientology Int’l v. Comm’r, 845 F. Supp. 714,
722–23 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (refusing to require the Service to disclose LEM
content about church audits in the context of a FOIA litigation). The last
time I read the LEM was before 2001.
131. T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-194, 2007 WL 4117442 (2007).
132. Id.
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routine after the death of her husband and kept it up despite
the concerns of her children for her safety. The court stated:
“Petitioner’s children, who had lost their father in an
automobile accident, were extremely worried about petitioner’s
early morning drives home from the casino, particularly in the
wintertime. Nevertheless, petitioner gambled and made these
late-night trips home nearly every day.”133
The Court’s description of Mrs. Myers’ behavior suggests
behavior driven more by compulsive need than desire for
profit. But the tax consequences to her if the activity were
merely a hobby would have been brutal. So, the court cut her a
break that another, less sympathetic, taxpayer may not have
received: it held her gambling was a business.134 Similarly, in
Le v. Commissioner the Tax Court appears to make a generous
decision that that the taxpayer’s use of Feng Shui to determine
his lucky days was a legitimate business action.135 Had the Les
not been in the “business” of playing slots, their AGI would
have been some $800,000 more than what they reported, which
would have triggered § 68, among other difficulties.136
A fourth practical problem is that decisions about
motivation are inherently intrusive into a taxpayer’s personal
life. For example, in Myers, we learn intimate details about the
taxpayer’s personal tragedies and family situation as part of
the process of deciding whether her gaming activity was a
business or was personal. That kind of intrusiveness is
suboptimal tax administration and is to be avoided if
reasonably possible. Current doctrine encourages it.
In sum, separation of deduction items from the income
that produces them creates additional burdens and costs not
only for taxpayers but also for tax administration. Those
burdens would disappear if gaming expenses were properly
133. Id. at *1.
134. See id. at *7 (concluding that Mrs. Myers had engaged in gambling
with the “actual and honest objective of making a profit in 2003”).
135. See Le, 2010 WL 2813420 at *3 (“We accordingly conclude that
petitioner was engaged in the trade or business within the meaning of
section 162 and that his gambling losses are not itemized deductions
reportable on Schedule A.”).
136. See id. at *2 (explaining that the Les had earnings of $852,230 in
2006).
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aligned with gaming income. Neither the per-transaction
approach nor the per-session approach makes that proper
alignment. While Congress could solve the practical problems
by allowing all gaming losses (whether hobby or gambling) to
go above the line, that solution would not solve the theoretical
problem of treating redeemable game credits as income in the
first place. Let’s look at the theory.
V. Current Doctrine Is Problematic in Theory
In addition to practical problems, the phenomenon of
redeemable game credits renews a long-standing theoretical
problem in tax: to what extent should the legal definition of
income align with or depart from an economic conception of
income. Both the per-transaction and per-session approach
illustrate the dangers of aligning too closely with the economic
models.
The foundational legal concept of the Tax Code is “gross
income.” Section 1 imposes tax on “taxable income.” Section 63
defines that term as “gross income minus the deductions
allowed by this chapter.” And it is § 61 that unsatisfactorily
defines “gross income,” as “all income from whatever source
derived.” Section 61, however, leaves single word “income”
undefined, leaving it the focus of much controversy, both in the
courts and in the commentary.
The relevant regulations state a rule that income is
anything of economic value, regardless of its form as cash,
property, or services.137 It is then up to the taxpayer to show
why an item of economic income is not or should not be legal
income.138 The Supreme Court’s decision in Glenshaw Glass v.
137. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (1957) (“Gross income includes income
realized in any form, whether in money, property or services. Income may be
realized, therefore, in the form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or
other property, as well as in cash.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in
2003)
[I]f services are paid for in property, the fair market value of the
property taken in payment must be included in income as
compensation. If services are paid for in exchange for other
services, the fair market value of such other services taken in
payment must be included in income as compensation.
138. See Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327–28 (1995) (stating
that economic income “constitutes gross income unless it is expressly
excepted by another provision in the Tax Code”). That case and others speak
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Commissioner139 is routinely cited as aligning the legal
definition of income to an economic conception of income.140
The theoretical problem is to explain why tax law does not
sweep everything of economic value into the legal definition of
income. My prior work answers this question by claiming that
the explanation comes from the operation of an income tax in a
democracy.141 Congress has written exclusions in the Tax Code,
and courts have created common law exclusions, for items that
fit the economic theory but, for reasons grounded in democratic
values, ought not to be taxed. Thus the legal meaning of
income is not ontological but operational, limited by
operational rules written both in other tax statutes and by
in terms of construing income items broadly and exclusions from income
narrowly. See id. (explaining that the corollary to § 61(a)’s broad construction
is the “default rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions from income
must be narrowly construed” (citation omitted)); see also United States v.
Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 583 (1991); Comm’r v. Jacobson,
336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949). The operational translation of that approach is found
in situations when there is a dispute between the Service and the taxpayer
over the propriety of inclusion. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327–28. Tax
procedure gives the Service determination of inclusion a very strong
presumption of correctness. See TAX CT. R. 142 (stating that the burden of
proof is on the petitioner, unless otherwise provided by statute or determined
by the Court); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1976) (stating
that the determination of the Commissioner is presumed correct and the
burden is on taxpayer to establish error); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111,
115 (1933) (same). Until that presumption is overcome, courts will not
examine the basis for the adjustments that have been made, the propriety of
the Commissioner’s motives, or the administrative policy or procedure used
in determining a deficiency. See Zuhone v. Comm’r, 883 F.2d 1317, 1325 (7th
Cir. 1989) (stating that courts have consistently held that they should refuse
to examine “evidence used or the propriety of the commissioner’s motives or
administrative policy or procedure in making the determination”). For an
excellent discussion, see Leandra Lederman, ‘Civil’izing Tax Procedure:
Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183 (1996).
139. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
140. Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA.
TAX REV. 295, 301–07 (2011) [hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, Defining
Income] (explaining that the expansion of the positive definition of income
culminated in Glenshaw Glass).
141. See Bryan Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual
Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 25 (2007) (explaining that “current tax
doctrine . . . contains three operational limits, or exceptions, to what
taxpayers must include as ‘gross income’”).
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courts. Those limitations, I have maintained, are aimed at
“preventing government over-reach when income is too
difficult to measure, too difficult to pay, or would require
intolerable government intrusion into individual lives.”142
Other scholars have also recognized this connection.143
Notably, Professors Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein have
expanded on that insight in two very comprehensive articles.144
They argue that because the operation of the tax law departs
from the economic theory of income, the legal meaning of
income should be decided by a broad standard, composed of
multiple indeterminate factors, rather than by a web of
rules.145
I believe that the problem of redeemable game credits
shows the weakness in this approach. The theoretical problem
is perhaps best framed as a debate between accountants and
economists over what should count as income, with
accountants taking perhaps a too operational view, economists
taking perhaps a too theoretical view, and lawyers borrowing
from both groups to arrive at a legal definition of income that
is a mix of both theory and practice. The key is to find the right
mix and find a good rule or set of rules to express it.
A. Accountants vs. Economists
Two groups of non-legal thinkers—accountants and
economists—have influenced the legal evolution of the term
“income.”146 Accountants tend to use the term in a very
practical way, to help their clients make decisions on how to
142. Id.
143. See generally Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 140.
144. See generally id.; Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 6.
145. See Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 140, at 346
(proposing that “the definition of income be acknowledged to be a standard
that should be interpreted in light of the values—including noneconomic
values—that animate the field of income taxation”).
146. See, e.g., Seto, supra note 5, at 1045 (providing an accounting
perspective of income taxation); EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A
STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME
AND ABROAD 19 (2d ed. 1921) (providing an economic perspective of income
taxation); Willard J. Graham, Some Observations on the Nature of Income,
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and Financial Reporting, 30 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 652, 653 (1965) (describing economic definitions of income
as advanced by theorists such as Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall).
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behave in a capitalist system. Economists tend to use the term
in a more theoretical way, to help further their study of the
human condition. One can see in the legal history of the term
a tug-of-war between these two groups. Those who write the
law, those who implement it, and those who interpret have
looked to both groups to help define the legal meaning of the
term “income.” My thesis here is that the current legal
meaning of gross income is best viewed as a compromise
between accountants and economists.
Financial accountants have long thought about “income”
as something distinct from “capital.” I cannot explain this
better than did Professor Seto:
From an accounting perspective, governments can tax two
kinds of things: stocks and flows. Stocks include but are not
limited to the kinds of items that would appear on a
balance sheet. Flows include but are not limited to the
kinds of items that would appear on an income statement.
For readers unfamiliar with accounting concepts, it may be
useful to think of a “stock” as analogous to the amount of
water in a storage tank at a specified point in time. A “flow”
is then analogous to the amount of water added to or taken
out of the tank over a specified period. More generally,
stocks represent the state of the world at any given point;
flows represent changes in that state over time. As a
general matter, governments can structure taxes in either
of two ways: they can tax the amount of water in the tank
at a particular moment (a tax on stocks) or they can tax the
amount added over a particular period (a tax on flows).
Head taxes and property taxes are taxes on stocks; income
taxes and sales taxes are generally taxes on flows. 147

Some early tax economists agreed with this accounting
view. Edwin Seligman, for example, a well-respected economist
and staunch proponent of the income tax in the early 1900s,
wrote that “income as contrasted with capital denotes that
amount of wealth which flows in during a definite period and
which is at the disposal of the owner for purposes of
consumption, so that in consuming it, his capital remains
unimpaired.”148

147.
148.

Seto, supra note 5, at 1045.
SELIGMAN, supra note 146, at 19.
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Other tax economists, however, rejected this accounting
view. Another prominent economist, Henry Simons, was
perhaps the most forceful. Simons made the point: “We do best,
in general, to regard income not as something accruing or
flowing with time—for such language is dangerously
figurative—but merely as a result imputed to particular
periods.”149 Simons preferred to think of income as “the
algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question.”150 Call this the standard economic model.151 Put in
equation form, Simons’ model formula looks like this where I =
Income, C = market value of rights exercised in consumption,
and ∆W = the change in wealth over time: I = C + ∆W.152
Notice that, for Simons, “income” is the residual term. It is
the result of figuring out the other two terms. Compare this
with the traditional Form 1040.153 Judged by the standard
economic model, the Form 1040 is exactly backwards. The form
first asks taxpayers for information about their income
(usually their gross income, although some lines ask for
income net of allowable deductions, such as the line which
taxpayers calculate using the Schedule C, on which they report
their business income and appropriate business deductions to
arrive at a net gain or loss on the business), with the
penultimate line being a catch-all for “other income.” Once
taxpayers report their gross income, they then take various

149. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 99 (1938).
150. Id. at 50.
151. For an illuminating study of Simons’s more nuanced thinking, see
Daniel Shaviro, The Forgotten Henry Simons, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2014).
I call this the “standard” economic model because it has formed the basis for
legal writing about the income tax.
152. Proponents of a cash-flow income tax do not seem to dispute the
basic model so much as desire to change the focus of what is to be taxed from
the Income variable to the Consumption variable, arguing that doing so
leads to a simpler and fairer tax regime. See William D. Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1118–22 (1974).
153. The traditional 1040 was last used for the 2017 tax year. See Form
1040, INTERNAL REV. SERV., https://perma.cc/GBC8-5BMP (PDF). The IRS has
departed from the traditional forms for tax years 2018 and 2019, but those
forms still ask the gross receipts questions first.
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deductions to eventually arrive at their “taxable income.” If an
economist designed the Form 1040, it would ask taxpayers to
first report the market rights of their consumption during the
time period and then report their change in wealth.
An accountant, however, will rearrange Simons’ equation
to this: I – C = ∆W. Income is what gets measured first, then
consumption is measured and subtracted from income. The
residual is your change in wealth.
In sum, accountants generally view income as something
directly measurable, that flows over time. In contrast,
economists generally conceive of income as what results from
changes in consumption and wealth over the reporting period;
it is the residual.
B. The Triumph of the Economists
The accounting and economic concepts of income have both
influenced the legal meaning of the term income. Early on, the
Supreme Court appeared to adopt the accounting view in
Eisner v. Macomber.154 The taxpayer there had received a
corporate dividend in the form of additional corporate stock.
The Court decided that what the taxpayer had received was an
increase in her capital—her stock—and hence could not be
income, or flow.155 Thus, to tax the stock dividend was to tax
capital stock and not income.156 While Congress could indeed
tax it, such a tax did not come under the 16th Amendment
apportionment exception to direct taxation because what was
being taxed was not “income” (or “flow”) but was, literally, the
stock.157
That the Court here adopted the accounting view of
income is evident in two aspects of its opinions: the source
doctrine and the realization doctrine. As to the first, the Court
held that mere accretion of wealth was not “income” within the
154. 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see also Graham, supra note 146, at 654–55
(referring to Eisner as the authority on the legal meaning of income).
155. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 219.
156. See id. (“The stockholder’s share in the accumulated profits of the
company is capital, not income.”).
157. Id.; see also Seto, supra note 5, at 1045 (stating that a “direct” tax
was a tax on “stock”).
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meaning of the 16th Amendment and, hence, could not be
“income” within the meaning of the language now in § 61.158
Instead, the Court opined that income arose from either of two
sources, capital or labor, calling that the understanding “used
in common speech.”159 This formulation implied that the source
of income mattered: increases in wealth not linked to capital or
labor or to a concept of income “used in common speech” could
not be income within the scope of the 16th Amendment.
Second, the Court looked to the idea of “realization,” an
accounting concept, to explain that mere increase in wealth did
not become “income” unless and until it was severed from the
capital.160 Until then it was just more water in the tank, a
“paper” gain that was still part of the “stock.”161 Thus, while a
cash dividend was income, a true stock dividend was not
because it left the taxpayer with no new assets and no change
in position with respect to the other owners of the corporation.
While the taxpayer had an increase in wealth, she did not
realize any income from it until she cashed out.162
158. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 219. The practical result of the case was to deny
Congress the ability to tax the amount in question because there was no
practical way for Congress to ensure the tax was imposed in proportion to
the population of each state.
159. See id. (“After examining dictionaries in common use . . . we find
little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the
Corporation Tax Act of 1909, ‘Income may be defined as the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined[.]’” (citations omitted)).
160. See id. at 207
Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital,
not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a
profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the
property, severed from the capital however invested or employed,
and coming in, being ‘derived’—that is, received or drawn by the
recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and
disposal— that is income derived from property. Nothing else
answers the description.
(emphasis in original).
161. See id. at 213 (“[T]he stockholder has ‘derived’ nothing except paper
certificates which, so far as they have any effect, deny him present
participation in such earnings.”).
162. See id. at 211
A stock dividend’ shows that the company’s accumulated profits
have been capitalized, instead of distributed to the stockholders or
retained as surplus available for distribution in money or in kind
should opportunity offer. Far from being a realization of profits of
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Eisner was the high water mark of the accounting
concept’s influence on the legal meaning of income. Over time,
the Supreme Court has repudiated the source doctrine and has
significantly weakened the realization doctrine. In so doing,
the Court has aligned the legal concept of income more closely
to the economic concept.
The source doctrine died in 1954 in Glenshaw Glass.163
The taxpayer there had been a plaintiff in a prior lawsuit who
did not report as income some $325,000 in punitive damages it
had received.164 The Third Circuit, relying on the “common
usage” limitation implied by Eisner, accepted the taxpayer’s
argument that punitive damage award was not income
because, being a windfall, it did not flow from either capital or
labor and ordinary folks would not consider it to be income.165
Refusing to be drawn in to a metaphysical argument about
how income derived from capital or labor, the Supreme Court
insisted that § 61 contained “no limitations as to the source of
taxable receipts, or restrictive labels as to their nature.”166
Instead of relying on a formalist inquiry as to source, the Court
inscribed into tax law and lore the famous formulation: the
receipt of $325,000 was gross income because it was an
“instance of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”167 This
the stockholder, it tends rather to postpone such realization, in
that the fund represented by the new stock has been transferred
from surplus to capital, and no longer is available for actual
distribution.
163. 348 U.S. 426, 429–30 (1955).
164. Id. at 428.
165. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1954)
(stating punitive damages “do not fall within the definition of Eisner v.
Macomber”). In effect, the Circuit Court punted the entire issue, noting that
“[t]he Supreme Court has never expressly departed from the definition of
income of Eisner v. Macomber” and that, in fact, “[t]here is as yet no decision
which has adopted the contentions made by the Government here.” Id. So, no
matter how attractive the government’s position might be, the Circuit
concluded that “if such a result is to be achieved after nearly two decades it
should be effected by the Supreme Court and not by this tribunal.” Id. at 934.
166. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429–30.
167. Id. at 431. The Court’s holding reflected the intent of the tax writers
who revised the 1939 Tax Code into the 1954 Tax Code. The House Ways and
Means Committee Report noted that “Section 61(a) provides that gross
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focus on access to and control of wealth aligned the legal
concept of income more closely with the economic concept of
income as the exercise of rights in consumption and changes in
wealth.168 Scholars debate the extent to which the Court was
embracing the general economic model.169 Those who argue it
was still concede that the Court’s use of the word “realized”
meant that the embrace was more of a side hug than a bear
hug.170
The realization requirement took a blow in 1947 in
Helvering v. Bruun171 when the Court held that income could
indeed include accrued economic value.172 There, the taxpayer
leased some land on which the tenant built a building. When
the tenant defaulted on the lease, the taxpayer got back the
property which now had a valuable building sitting on it.
Relying on Eisner the taxpayer argued that since the
termination of the lease did not (and indeed could not) formally
sever the building from the land, all that had happened was
income includes ‘all income from whatever source derived.’ This definition is
based upon the 16th Amendment and the word ‘income’ is used in its
constitutional sense.” H. R. REP. NO. 1337, n. 10, at A18 (1952).
168. See Joseph M. Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw Glass: Towards a
Modern Concept of Gross Income, in TAX STORIES 17, 23 (Paul L. Caron ed.,
2d ed. 2009) (explaining that the Macomber definition of income considers it
erroneous to view “income” as separate from “gains”). It is true that the
Court made no reference to Simons’s definition, nor does it appear that any
of the parties before the Court argued for it. See id. at 22 (noting that the
parties’ briefs focused primarily on the Macomber definition of income).
Nonetheless, by rejecting source as the touchstone for the legal definition,
the Glenshaw Glass Court freed the legal meaning from the accounting
shackles and aligned it more closely with the economic vision. Commentators
generally believe that the “breadth of the Glenshaw Glass definition appears
to be nearly co-extensive with the Haig-Simons definition of income, which is
widely accepted as providing the theoretical foundation for the income tax.
Accordingly, many tax professionals interpret the language in section 61 and
Glenshaw Glass solely in light of the economic principles reflected in the
Haig-Simons definition.” Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note
140, at 296–97. I agree with Professors Abreu and Greenstein on that.
169. Dodge, supra note 168, at 39 (stating that the Glenshaw Glass Court
“did not explicitly commit to any single normative and comprehensive
conception of personal income taxation”).
170. Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 140, at 306–07.
171. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
172. See id. at 469 (“Gain may occur as a result of exchange of property,
payment of the taxpayer’s indebtedness, relief from a liability, or other profit
realized from the completion of a transaction.”).
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that the underlying property had appreciated in value.173 What
the taxpayer had gotten back was just like a true stock
dividend. The Court rejected that view and found that the
appreciation in the property due to the building was indeed
“income” within the meaning of the statute.174 The Court said
the taxpayer had to report the value of the building as income
in the year the lease terminated and that the government did
not need to wait until the taxpayer took some action to convert
the now more valuable “stock” into cash “flow.”175
The realization requirement was chopped down further in
1991 in Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner.176 There the
taxpayer bank had swapped a portfolio of mortgage loans with
another bank’s portfolio of loans. The taxpayer had a basis of
$6.9 million in the portfolio but because interest rates had
risen dramatically, the stream of income generated by that
$6.9 million could now be generated by a mere $4.5 million in
loans. Accordingly, the face value of the taxpayer’s portfolio
had dropped. The taxpayer figured that if it swapped its
portfolio with another, more recent, set of loans worth $4.5
million, it could take a $2.4 million loss and still be in the same
economic position as it was before relative to risk of default. So
in an attempt to cash out the loss it did the swap. The Service
argued the swap was not a realization event sufficient to
trigger the § 1001 calculations because there was no change in
economic position by the bank. It really had not cashed out of
anything as evidenced by its strict compliance with the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board’s Memorandum R-49 which approved
such deals only when the mortgage loan portfolios were
173. See id. at 468 (stating that the respondent argued “that gain derived
from capital must be something of exchangeable value proceeding from
property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and
received by the recipient for his separate use, benefit, and disposal”).
174. See id. at 469 (“[T]he realization of gain need not be in cash derived
from the sale of an asset.”).
175. Id. Congress statutorily overruled Bruun by writing a cash-out rule
in § 109, which provides that “gross income does not include income (other
than rent) derived by a lessor of real property on the termination of a lease.”
Section 1019 drops the other shoe: the amount excluded by § 109 cannot
figure into basis and so will eventually be included in income when the lessor
cashes out by selling or exchanging the property.
176. 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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“substantially identical” such that there was no transfer of
risk.177
The Supreme Court held that the swap was a realization
event.178 The Court said the swap met the “administrative
purposes underlying the realization requirement in § 1001(a)”
because it resulted in the parties having “legal entitlements
that are different in kind or extent.”179 The test was thus
whether there was an ascertainable, reportable, and verifiable
change in legal relations: “as long as the property entitlements
are not identical, their exchange will allow both the
Commissioner and the transacting taxpayer easily to fix the
appreciated or depreciated values of the property relative to
their tax bases.”180
C. The Persistence of Accounting Memory
Like Monty Python’s Black Knight, the accounting concept
of income may have lost some limbs, but has never been
completely out of the fight over the legal meaning of income.181
That is because tax administrators are more like accountants
than economists: income is not an abstraction to be debated,
but a reality to be taxed. Tax administration requires rules
that people can follow—both those subject to the law and those
who must administer it. The need to administer the law to a
population of over 150 million individual taxpayers ensures
the legal concept of “gross income” will never reach as far as
the economic concept.182 Hence, discussion of tax

177. For a good summary of this story, see Scott Lenz, Note, The
Symmetry of the Realization Requirement and Its Application to the
“Mortgage Swap” Cases, 9 VA. TAX. REV. 359 (1989).
178. The Court rejected the government’s contention that it had to
evaluate “the attitudes of the parties, the evaluation of the interests by the
secondary mortgage market, and the views of the [Federal Home Loan Bank
Board]” to decide whether realization occurred. Cottage Savings Ass’n, 499
U.S. at 565.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Monty Python and the Holy Grail, IMDB, https://perma.cc
/HS5F-5K7L (last visited May 9, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
182. In Fiscal Year 2018, the Service received over 145 million individual
tax returns. See INTERNAL REV. SERV., I.R.S. DATA BOOK 4 (2018), https://
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policy—including any normative discussion—cannot be
divorced from implementation.
The current legal meaning of income reflects a balance
between the economic and accounting meanings. Two
accounting concepts relevant to this Article persist in the law:
the idea of an accounting period and the idea of imputed
income. Each has an associated legal doctrine that articulates
that persistence.
1. Accounting Periods and the Doctrine of Constructive Receipt
The most obvious accounting concept is found in the
requirement for an annual accounting period. As the Supreme
Court put it in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,183 “[i]t is the
essence of any system of taxation that it should produce
revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government, at
regular intervals.”184 The economist’s view of income does not
translate well into tax law because it ignores the practical
requirement that income be something that can be reliably
measured and reported. The Service cannot collect tax on
items that cannot be measured and reported. Unlike an
economist, the Service cannot assume payment.
Taxpayers generally use one of two methods to account for
their income: cash or accrual. Taxpayers choosing the cash
method report the income they actually receive during the
year.185 In contrast, accrual method taxpayers report income
when all events have occurred to fix their right to an
ascertainable amount, whether or not they have actually
received that amount.186
For both methods, § 441(a) creates an annual accounting
rule. Taxpayers make their annual accounting on the forms
prescribed by the Service.187 Section 451(a) tells cash method
perma.cc/3ST7-H2QH (PDF). Since many were joint returns, the actual
number of taxpayers is much higher. Id.
183. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
184. Id. at 365.
185. § 451(a).
186. § 451(b)(1).
187. Section 6011 instructs taxpayers to use the “forms and regulations
prescribed by” the Service and to report the “information required by such
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taxpayers to include on their yearly tax return all the income
they have received in that year. Taxpayers make only one
return for each yearly accounting period.188
Any rule invites evasion and the annual accounting rule is
no exception. Early in the modern era of income tax, cash
method taxpayers attempted to push income items from one
accounting year into the next. The courts and the Service
quickly came up with the constructive receipt rule to combat
those attempts to push income from one year into the next.
Tax regulations created the constructive receipt rule in
1916.189 The contours of the rule have not much changed since
then and are currently set out in Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer’s
possession is constructively received by him in the taxable
year during which it is credited to his account, set apart for
him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon
it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it
during the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw
had been given. However, income is not constructively
received if the taxpayer’s control of its receipt is subject to
substantial limitations or restrictions.190

You can see the early development of the doctrine in
Appeal of Brander.191 Mr. Brander was a fifty percent
shareholder of a corporation that paid him a salary of $115,166
forms or regulations.” § 6011(a). Given that the Service processed over 145
million individual income tax returns in Fiscal Year 2018, one quickly sees
why Congress has delegated to the Service the power to regulate the
reporting requirement. For discussion of a recent case in which the taxpayer
unsuccessfully challenged the applicable forms and regulations, see Bryan
Camp, Lesson from the Tax Court: Taxpayer Cannot Cure Reporting Error
During Audit, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/MT56-272B
(last visited Mar. 10, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
188. Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 401 (1984). I explain the one
return rule in Bryan Camp, Lesson from the Tax Court: The One Return
Rule, TAXPROF BLOG (July 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/8C38-ZKCJ (last visited
Dec. 23, 2019) (stating that a taxpayer may only file one return document for
limitation period purposes and penalty purposes) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
189. See In re Republication of A.R.R. 4385, GCM 34788 (I.R.S. Feb. 28,
1972).
190. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
191. 3 B.T.A. 231 (1925).
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in 1915. He did not actually receive all of that. He received
$112,662, with the remainder left on the corporation’s books as
accrued and owing, but unpaid. He reported income that year
of the $112,662 he had actually received. On audit, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) said that he should have reported
the entire $115,166. In the ensuing litigation, the Board of Tax
Appeals held that Mr. Brander had constructively received the
entire amount of salary he was entitled to in 1915 because of
his control over the corporation:
During the year he . . . could just as freely have permitted it
to pay its salary debt to him. It was not that the corporation
would not pay, but rather that he would not receive. This
election to give the corporation the temporary use of the
amount is an exercise by him of its enjoyment, and this is
one of the primary attributes of income. The Commissioner
therefore correctly determined that the taxpayer’s income
from salary and commission was $115,166.192

The constructive receipt doctrine is a timing doctrine. It
tells a taxpayer the proper accounting period in which the
taxpayer must report an item of income. The relevant
accounting period is not a daily period, a monthly period, or a
transactional period, starting and stopping with each
transaction. It is a yearly period. The purpose of the
constructive receipt doctrine is to force taxpayers to conform to
the § 451(a) yearly accounting requirement and to deny them
the ability to choose which year to receive income. As
then-Judge Felix Frankfurter explained: “The doctrine of
constructive receipt was, no doubt, conceived by the Treasury
in order to prevent a taxpayer from choosing the year in which
to return income merely by choosing the year in which to
reduce it to possession.”193
Put another way, the question answered by the
constructive receipt doctrine is when does a taxpayer receive
income, not whether a taxpayer receives income. It does not
turn every refusal to accept something of value into income. An
example is Mott v. Commissioner.194 There, the taxpayer was
192. Id. at 236.
193. Ross v. Comm’r, 169 F.2d 483, 491 (1st Cir. 1948).
194. 30 B.T.A. 1040 (1934), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Comm’r v.
Mott, 85 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1936).
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trustee of three trusts he had created for each of his three
children. The trust instruments entitled the trustee to
compensation of three percent of the trust income. He had total
control on whether to pay himself the compensation he was
entitled to receive. The taxpayer never paid himself the
compensation. On audit, the BIR determined that the three
percent compensation was constructively received. Both the
Board of Tax Appeals and the Sixth Circuit rejected the
application of the constructive receipt timing doctrine to an
outright refusal to accept compensation— as opposed to a
deferral. Wrote the Board:
To say that petitioner received these amounts as
compensation is to indulge in a deliberate legal fiction.
Petitioner had the right to render his services free if he
wished, and we know of no rule of law which requires a
person to accept compensation or income. The fiction of
constructive receipt of income is resorted to usually to fix
the time of receipt, where it is ultimately actually received
and accepted.195

2. Realization and the Bargain Purchase
To an economist like Simons, income comes from
appreciation in a property’s value as much as from cash
inflows. Both are part of the ∆W term.196 The need for an
accounting period, however, creates a measurement problem
because not all economic income flows neatly within the
bounds of the tax accounting period, particularly when the
income arises from ownership of property. Marking one’s
195. 30 B.T.A. at 1044 (emphasis added); see also Giannini v. Comm’r, 42
B.T.A. 546, 556–57 (1940), aff’d sub nom. Comm’r v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 638
(9th Cir. 1942) (stating that bank president did not constructively receive
salary when he waived receipt, nor did his suggestion that the money be
used for charity constitute assignment of income); Estate of Kiser v. Comm’r,
12 T.C. 178, 182 (1949) (stating that executor of estate did not constructively
receive fees when he waived receipt); Wood v. Comm’r, 22 B.T.A. 535, 537
(1931) (same); Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 C.B. 20 (stating that statutory fees or
commissions are not included in the gross income of the executor of an estate
when the executor effectively waives his right to receive such fees or
commissions).
196. As Professor Shaviro points out: “[T]he Haig-Simons income
definition gives realization absolutely no place. Changes in the market value
of one’s assets are economic income, as the definition makes clear, whether
one sells the assets or not.” Shaviro, supra note 151, at 30.
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property to market values at the start and end of each
accounting period would be one solution.
The idea of realization is the accountant’s solution. The
concept of realization allows taxpayers to track the income
represented by appreciation in property by waiting until they
have done something to unlock that appreciated value.197 The
focus is on finding a suitably identifiable event by which the
taxpayer actualizes the economic abstraction of appreciation.198
Economists dislike the realization concept because it
ignores the economic truth that appreciated property makes a
person wealthier before (and sometimes long before) any
realization event. Simons, for example, called the realization
concept a “professional conspiracy against truth.”199 Anyone
with a home equity mortgage is probably part of that
conspiracy. Still, even Simons apparently accepted that the
practical benefits of a realization rule outweighed the
theoretical tidiness of a mark-to-market rule, and so
realization is the rule.200
The realization requirement is another accounting rule
that boils down to timing.201 Before an accession to wealth is
reportable as gross income, there must be some event by which
the taxpayer realizes that accession in a way as to be legally

197. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The
Continuing Legacy of Realization, in TAX STORIES 53, 54 (Paul L. Caron ed.,
2003) (noting that realization “provides many opportunities for taxpayers to
manipulate their tax status to achieve desirable tax consequences”).
198. Or, as Professor Kornhauser puts it, “some transaction, usually a
market transaction, must occur which changes the taxpayer’s relationship to
the asset.” Id. at 55.
199. Id. (quoting Simons).
200. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). I was
certainly surprised to learn about Simons’s views from Professor Shaviro,
supra note 151, at 38 (“[H]e considered realization ‘relatively unobjectionable
in principle where it results only in postponement of assessment’ rather than
its permanent elimination.”).
201. See Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule,
57 TAX L. REV. 355, 388 (2004) (“Taxpayers can magnify the advantage of the
timing option by strategically timing sales, taking losses when the tax rate is
high and deferring gains until the rate is low.”).
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taxable.202 There is a continuum of choices.203 Lots of events
might occur, and which ones constitute a “realization event” is
a practical inquiry, which has turned out to be significantly
path-dependent.204
202. See id. at 357–58 (“A realization event does not create income but
merely serves to denominate the point in time at which the taxpayer reports
the accrued income.”).
203. See id. at 396 (stating that “[s]ince neither an accrual tax or a pure
realization rule is tolerable, the task for policymakers is to determine where
along the continuum to draw the line”).
204. The American legal system depends on a concept of judicial
precedent where the outcome of one case determines the range of potential
outcomes in later cases. This is true even for highly codified areas of law like
tax. An outcome in an earlier case may well block one or more paths to
alternative outcomes in future cases. Actions by other legal institutions, such
as Congress and the Service, also affect the range of potential outcomes. One
valuable service traditionally provided by the academy has been to expand
the range of available choices by discovering new analytical paths for courts
to use when addressing recurring issues. A good example of this dynamic
between Congress, courts, commentators, and the Service is found in
Commissioner v. Tufts, where the Court wrestled with how to treat relief
from a non-recourse debt. 461 U.S. 300 (1983). Professor Wayne G. Barnett
of Stanford had marked out the best approach to the problem, but the Court
would not adopt it. See id. at 317 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I would take a
quite different approach— that urged upon us by Professor Barnett as
amicus.”). The majority agreed that the Service approach, adopted by the
Court in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), had significant problems,
including that it “laid the foundation stone of most tax shelters.” Tufts, 461
U.S. at 309. But while “a different approach might have been taken,” the
Court would “express no view as to whether such an approach would be
consistent with the statutory structure.” Id. at 308. It was just too late in the
day because the government pressed its case on the ground already
well-trod. The Court would not deviate from the path previously chosen by
the Service and blessed by the Court. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
explained why the Court accepted a “second best” resolution of the issue. See
Tufts, 461 U.S. at 318–20
Persuaded though I am by the logical coherence and internal
consistency of [Prof. Barnett’s] approach, I agree with the Court’s
decision not to adopt it judicially. We do not write on a slate
marked only by Crane. The Commissioner’s longstanding position
is now reflected in the regulations. In the light of the numerous
cases in the lower courts including the amount of the unrepaid
proceeds of the mortgage in the proceeds on sale or disposition, it
is difficult to conclude that the Commissioner’s interpretation of
the statute exceeds the bounds of his discretion. As the Court’s
opinion demonstrates, his interpretation is defensible. One can
reasonably read § 1001(b)’s reference to “the amount realized from
the sale or other disposition of property” . . . to permit the
Commissioner to collapse the two aspects of the transaction. As
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Early in the modern era of tax the question came up as to
whether a bargain purchase was a realization event.205 That is,
was the act of purchasing property a realization event when
the price paid was far less than the property’s fair market
value.206 If so, the taxpayer would need to report the difference
between the cost and the fair market value as gross income.207
As early as 1926 the Board of Tax Appeals held that an
arms-length bargain purchase was not a realization event.208
The reason was ipse dixit:
[I]t is not at all unusual that the purchaser of property may
through his ability and shrewdness as a buyer, or by reason
of other influences or forces, be able to purchase property at
a price substantially lower than the price at which it may
be immediately sold, but it does not follow that gain is
presently realized through such a purchase. 209

The Supreme Court gave an actual rationale in Palmer v.
Commissioner.210 A bargain purchase was not a realization
event because of an inference from what is now codified in
§ 1001.211 The Court noted that since that statute provided
that realization happened upon a “sale or other disposition,”
long as his view is a reasonable reading of § 1001(b), we should
defer to the regulations promulgated by the agency charged with
interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, I concur.
205. See McMichael v. Comm’r, 4 B.T.A. 266, 267 (1926) (“This appeal
raises the question of the taxpayers’ gain . . . .” from a bargain purchase and
subsequent sale of stock).
206. See id. (explaining that taxpayer contended that the stock was
worth at least as much in 1913 as it was sold for in 1917, and that no income
arose out of the transaction, while commissioner contended that the basis for
determining gain is the cost of the stock to the taxpayer).
207. See id. at 269 (“The Commissioner determined the taxable gain on
the installment basis in proportion as the selling price for the stock was paid,
and this method of computation is not in question in this appeal.”).
208. See Geeseman v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 258, 263 (1938) (“[T]he
purchase of property does not result in the realization of taxable
gain . . . upon sale the general rule is that no taxable gain is realized until
the seller has recovered his cost or capital.”).
209. Id. at 264.
210. 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
211. See id. at 69 (“But the bare fact that a transaction, on its face a sale,
has resulted in a distribution of some of the corporate assets to stockholders,
gives rise to no inference that the distribution is a dividend . . . .”).
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that meant that an arms-length bargain purchase did not
result in income to the taxpayer:
Profit, if any, accrues to [the taxpayer] only upon sale or
disposition, and the taxable income is the difference
between the amount thus realized and its cost, less allowed
deductions. It follows that one does not subject himself to
income tax by the mere purchase of property, even if at less
than its true value, and that taxable gain does not accrue to
him before he sells or otherwise disposes of it. 212

An important component to the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Palmer was the arms-length nature of the
transaction.213 Employees of corporations who received and
exercised stock options to buy corporate stock at below-market
values tried to shoehorn themselves into the bargain purchase
rule.214 But the Supreme Court later disallowed those efforts
and distinguished Palmer in Commissioner v. LoBue,215
writing:
It is true that our taxing system has ordinarily treated an
arm’s length purchase of property even at a bargain price
as giving rise to no taxable gain in the year of purchase.
[See Palmer.] But that is not to say that when a transfer
which is in reality compensation is given the form of a
purchase the Government cannot tax the gain under
[§ 61(a)]. The transaction here was unlike a mere purchase.
It was not an arm’s length transaction between strangers.
Instead it was an arrangement by which an employer
transferred valuable property to his employees in
recognition of their services. We hold that LoBue realized
taxable gain when he purchased the stock.216
212. Id. In contrast, purchase of discounted property as part of a scheme
of compensation does count as gross income. Id. at 67–68 (“[P]rofits derived
from the purchase of property, as distinguished from exchanges of property,
are ascertained and taxed as of the date of its sale or other disposition by the
purchaser.”).
213. See Comm’r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 248 (1956) (“It is true that our
taxing system has ordinarily treated an arm’s length purchase of property
even at a bargain price as giving rise to no taxable gain in the year of
purchase.” (citing Palmer, 302 U.S. at 69)).
214. See generally William P. Wiggins, When Does a Bargain Purchase
Become a Taxable Bargain Purchase? 86 TAX MAG. 45, 57–59 (2008)
(discussing various cases in which those receiving compensation in the form
of stock options argued it was a bargain purchase, not income).
215. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
216. Id. at 248.
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Other means of acquiring property may also constitute
realization events. For example, acquisition of treasure trove
does produce gross income in the amount of the property’s fair
market value.217 Thus, a taxpayer who picks up an 1899
Morgan Silver Dollar minted in Philadelphia on the street
must report income of its fair market value of about $70 but a
taxpayer who buys the same coin at an estate sale for $20 does
not have to report $50 of income.218
Generally, however, the realization rules key off when an
event can be a “disposition” within the meaning of § 1001.219
Only when a taxpayer makes a “sale or other disposition” of
property must the taxpayer identify an amount realized and
report the excess of that amount over basis as gross income.220
What constitutes a “disposition” is determined in large
part by case law and is driven by practical inquiry on what is
administrable.221 The current realization rule is one that looks
to legal relationships rather than economic relationships. The
rule looks at whether there was an administratively
convenient event between the taxpayer and another that meets
the “administrative purposes underlying the realization
requirement in § 1001(a)” by creating “legal entitlements that
are different in kind or extent” between the parties.222

217. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1960) (“Treasure trove, to the extent of its
value in United State currency, constitutes gross income for the taxable year
in which it is reduced to undisputed possession.”).
218. See 1899 Morgan Silver Dollar Value, COIN STUDY (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Q3PQ-QMBC (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (providing insight
on current coin values) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
219. See Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) (“The
realization requirement is implicit in § 1001(a) of the Code . . . which defines
‘the gain [or loss] from the sale or other disposition of property’ as the
difference between ‘the amount realized’ from the sale or disposition of the
property and its ‘adjusted basis.’”).
220. See id. (“[T]o realize a gain or loss in the value of property, the
taxpayer must engage in a ‘sale or other disposition of [the] property.’”).
221. See supra notes 176–180 and accompanying text (discussing Cottage
Savings Ass’n).
222. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 565.
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D. The Theoretical Problem with Current Electronic Gaming
Tax Rules
Both current doctrinal approaches to taxing electronic
gaming improperly favor the economic concept of income and
disfavor the accounting concept. First, both approaches rely on
a distorted application of the constructive receipt doctrine.
This reliance comes from the practical ease of tracking
electronic gaming activity. This distorted application elides the
concept of an annual accounting. As a result, both approaches
end up taxing consumption rather than income. Second, both
approaches negate the realization rule. They ignore the
underlying legal relationship, created by gaming account
agreements, between gamers and gaming providers. They
instead treat as real the distracting labels used in those
accounts associated with redeemable gaming credits. As a
result, both approaches impose taxation on economic income
that has not been realized under the current concept of
realization. I discuss each problem in turn.
1. Current Rules Distort the Constructive Receipt Doctrine
As early as 1925 the Board of Tax Appeals warned:
“Constructive receipt is an artificial concept which must be
sparingly applied, lest it become a means for taxing something
other than income and thus violating the Constitution
itself.”223 The Board was likely reflecting the then-common
view that constitutionally taxable income was solely flows and
did not cover appreciation in stocks.224 Still, the warning is
apropos. Both the per-transaction rule and the per-session rule
distort the constructive receipt doctrine to tax something other
than income. That something is consumption. They tax the
churn. While Congress could do that by imposing an excise tax,
the income tax does not reach so far.
A per-transaction rule treats each game or play of a slot
machine as a reportable transaction that produces either a
gain or loss. Professor Seto’s reasoning is that since the
taxpayer could (in theory) cash out the redeemable game

223.
224.

Brander v. Comm’r, 3 B.T.A. 231, 235 (1925).
See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text.
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credits won after each successful wager, the taxpayer should
be deemed to have done so.225
Failing to redeem a redeemable game credit during a year
when the game credit gets used, however, does not push
income from one year into the next. That is true whether the
failure happens after each game or after each “session.”226 The
taxpayer has instead simply augmented their “stock” of play in
much the same way taxpayers do when they are using slot
machine tokens or using clay chips when betting on roulette or
other table games in casinos.227 Like tokens and chips,
redeemable game credits are an accounting mechanism to
track what the casino or website operator will owe the
taxpayer if and when the taxpayer decides to redeem them.
The constructive receipt rule should not operate to force a
taxpayer to report income for each transaction or for each
deemed daily session. Doing so simply taxes consumption.
Consider again our two intrepid players Alice and Myra.
We will use the same numbers but now assume both are
playing on Worldwinner or that both are playing slots in a
casino. Each spends $20 in a day enjoying their gaming
activity and consuming the gaming services provided by the
website owner or by the casino.
Imagine now that Alice is twice as skillful as Myra. Thus,
while Myra interstitially wins P$132 in redeemable game
credits, Alice wins P$264 before exhausting her account. Both
have still spent $20 to play games. The only difference now is
that Alice got more play for her $20 cost. She got more
consumption for her money. Saying that Alice has double the

225. See Seto, supra note 5, at 1043 (“[I]f in practice there is a high
probability that players who earn redeemable or convertible in-world
currency or credits can cash out at will, the earning of such credits
constitutes theoretic ‘income.’”).
226. See Park v. Comm’r, 722 F.3d 384, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“U.S.
citizens do not treat every play or wager as a taxable event. The result is
that U.S. citizens can measure their gambling winnings and losses on a
per-session basis.” (citation omitted, emphasis in original)).
227. See Seto, supra note 5, at 1035 (“Even if she does not log on again
for a year, the software excludes all others from her property in the interim.
When she returns, she continues to be able to use, exclude, and assign that
same property.”).
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gross income of Myra simply taxes her for her ability to make
her initial $20 last longer. It taxes her consumption of gaming.
Courts and the Service have rejected the per-transaction
rule in this scenario.228 Courts have found persuasive that the
operative legal language in § 165(d) is written in the plural.229
The Service hangs its legal analysis on the fact that § 165(b)
speaks of transactions, in the plural. The CCA 2008-11 finds
that the use of the plural implies a permitted netting:
The better view is that a casual gambler, such as the
taxpayer who plays the slot machines, recognizes a
wagering gain or loss at the time she redeems her tokens.
We think that the fluctuating wins and losses left in play
are not accessions to wealth until the taxpayer redeems her
tokens and can definitively calculate the amount above or
below basis (the wager) realized. 230

Notice that the CCA is discussing the use of tokens. The
same logic, however, applies to electronic redeemable game
credits. Tokens are just tangible redeemable game credits.
Similarly Judge Kavanagh in the Park case believed the
word “gains” was the key.231 Recall that case involved
nonresident aliens. Section 871 taxes a nonresident alien who
is not in the business of gambling on all “gains.” That includes,
say the courts, gains from wagering transactions.232 Worse,
nonresident aliens cannot deduct losses from wagering
transactions.233 Thus, the proper netting rule becomes all the
more important for them.

228. See Park, 722 F.3d at 387 (stating that there would be practical
“difficulties . . . if slots players had to track the wins from every pull of the
slot machine lever”).
229. See id at 386 (“We begin our independent analysis by noting that
the key term in interpreting Section 871—‘gains’—also appears in Section
165(d) . . . .”).
230. CCA 2008-11 at 4.
231. Park, 722 F.3d at 386.
232. Barba v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 674, 675–78 (1983).
233. See id. (stating that the Revenue Act of 1936 changed the way
non-resident aliens are taxed to be different from U.S. citizens). Additionally,
§ 871(a)(1) taxes nonresident aliens for all “interest . . . dividends, rents,
salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations,
emoluments, and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains,
profits, and income” received from sources in the United States. Section 183
forbids § 165(d) deductions. See id.
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Judge Kavanaugh believed the proper netting came in the
process of determining “gains” in the first place, both as the
word was used in § 871 and in § 165(d). He relied on the CCA
2008-11 analysis that rejected the per-transaction approach
applied equally well to nonresident aliens, writing “the logic
and analysis of the Service’s per-session approach to U.S.
taxpayers in Section 165(d) has no less force when applied to
non-resident aliens in Section 871.”234 He then made the
important point that the issue was not which wagering losses
were to be netted against which wagering “gains.”235 The issue
was the very meaning of “gains.”
The IRS’s only real response is that . . . once wins and
losses are calculated—whether on a per-bet or per-session
basis— non-resident aliens may not deduct losses from wins
when doing their annual income taxes. The IRS therefore
concludes that non-resident aliens should be required to
pay taxes on each winning pull of the slot machine lever.
The IRS’s reasoning is a non sequitur. What the IRS says
about deductions for non-resident aliens . . . has nothing to
do with the issue in this case. The fact that non-resident
aliens may not deduct gambling losses from gambling
winnings does not tell us how to measure those losses and
winnings in the first place.236

Recall the economic concept of income is the sum, over the
accounting period, of a taxpayer’s exercise of rights in
consumption added to the taxpayer’s change in wealth.237
Thus, any definition of income will necessarily implicate
consumption. The current legal definition of income, however,
holds onto the accounting concept of periodicity with the
relevant period being one year.238 The constructive receipt
doctrine, properly applied, is a timing doctrine that polices the
one-year accounting period, blocking taxpayers from moving
income from one year into the next. To use the constructive
receipt doctrine to decide whether a taxpayer has income at
234. Park, 722 F.3d at 386.
235. Id. at 387.
236. Id.
237. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 137 and accompanying text for further discussion on
the definition of income.
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any other discrete point in time within the annual accounting
period blows a hole in the annual accounting period rule for
determining income.
The per-session method is just as flawed in this regard as
the per-transaction method. The per-session rule explicitly
recognizes that “fluctuating wins and losses left in play are not
accessions to wealth until the taxpayer redeems her tokens.”239
That’s a step in the right direction. But then both the CCA and
the implementing regulations (on the information reporting
side) ignore that step when they arbitrarily limit a session to
one twenty-four hour period and apply a constructive receipt
rule to whatever redeemable game credits the taxpayer has in
the account at the end of that twenty-four hour period.240 The
rationale given in Preambles of both the proposed and final
reporting regulations is that the twenty-four hour period for
reporting was “intended to facilitate reporting by payees on
their individual income tax returns under the proposed safe
harbor in Notice 2015-21, 2105-12 I.R.B. 765.”241 However,
there is no rationale given in Notice 2015-21 for the concept of
a “session.” Instead, the Notice simply assumes the existence
of a session because it is addressing a scenario where the
taxpayer is using physical tokens. That assumption does not
hold for electronic gaming accounts.
The per-session rule is again a distortion of the
constructive receipt rule’s purpose. Imagine that our player
Myra is able to use her $20 initial deposit to play slots for a
time period that crosses the twenty-four hour session. Until
she loses all her money, she has “fluctuating wins and losses
left in play.” Assume that at the very end of the first
twenty-four hour period—say it ends at 3:59 a.m.—her
239. CCA 2008-11 at 5.
240. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-10(b)(2) (2016). This reporting regulation gives
casinos the choice of using a calendar day or a “gaming day” which is defined
as “a 24-hour period other than a calendar day . . . selected by the payor”
with the exception that the regulations put a hard cut-off for midnight on
December 31st of each year.
241. 81 Fed. Reg. 96,374 (December 30, 2016) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1,
7, 15). The regulations give casinos the flexibility to designate any 24-hour
period as a gaming session, with the exception that midnight on December
31 is a hard cutoff. Judging by the examples given in the regulations, most
casinos will likely start their 24-hour reporting period in early evening or
early morning.
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“fluctuating wins and losses left in play” net out to an account
balance of $30 because at that moment in time she has had
more interstitial wins than losses. Myra continues to play until
her account balance is reduced to zero. To say that she has
constructively received $10 at that magic moment of 3:59 a.m.
is taxing her consumption of gaming and not any accretions to
wealth. Her winnings are still “left in play” in the electronic
account, to use the CCA language. Thus, by taxing the
unredeemed units of play at the end of each session, the
per-session method also taxes consumption and not income.242
The one point in time where it would be proper to use the
constructive receipt doctrine is at the end of the tax year; the
reporting regulations impose a hard cutoff of midnight on
December 31 for casinos to report any winnings held in an
electronic account.243 But even then the constructive receipt
doctrine would not apply unless the taxpayer actually redeems
those gaming credits in the next tax year. The constructive
receipt doctrine is about timing. It forces a taxpayer to pull
back into a prior tax year income the taxpayer actually realizes
in a future tax year. If a taxpayer has no income in either year,
the doctrine has nothing to operate on.
Thus, the strong argument is that the constructive receipt
doctrine should not ever apply to Alice and Myra, not even if
they have a redeemable balance on December 31, because they
completely use up their $20. Whether they do so in one session
or two, or whether they do so in one year or two does not
matter. Either way there are never “undeniable accessions to

242. Some would call this consumption “in-kind consumption” because
the taxpayer receives something (play) that can be, and is in fact, consumed.
Professor Dodge believes that in-kind consumption should normally be
counted as gross income. See Joseph Dodge, Accessions to Wealth, Realization
of Gross Income, and Dominion and Control: Applying the ‘Claim of Right
Doctrine’ to Found Objects, Including Record-Setting Baseballs, 4 FLA. TAX.
REV. 685, 701 n.62 (2000) (“Generally, in-kind consumption should be
included in gross income where it is judged to be the equivalent of the receipt
of cash followed by a free, or lightly constrained, spending choice.”). To the
extent one views winning redeemable game credits as in-kind consumption,
the value should be imputed to the taxpayer’s own efforts and would not
count as gross income under the doctrine of imputed income. See Camp,
supra note 141, at 37–44 for a more in-depth discussion of imputed income.
243. Treas. Reg. § 1.6401-10(b)(3).
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wealth, clearly realized.”244 It is this realization requirement
that is the second theoretical problem with both the
per-transaction and per-session approaches to the problem of
taxing redeemable game credits. To that problem I now turn.
2. Current Rules Ignore Realization
Even in the unlikely event that a taxpayer is reporting on
the accrual method, the current rules violate a second strong
and persistent accounting rule: realization. A player account,
whether with an online company like Worldwinner or a
brick-and-mortar casino, is easily conceptualized as property, a
chose in action: the right to play.245 Section 61 speaks of
“income,” § 74 speaks of “prizes,” the reporting statute § 6041
speaks of “payments” and the implementing regulation to
§ 6041 speaks in terms of “winnings” but when discussing
property values, all of these terms mean nothing until there
has been a realization event, an event that changes the legal
relationships between the player and gaming operator
(whether a casino or website operator like Worldwinner).246
Fluctuations in a taxpayer’s electronic gaming account
balance represent no change in the legal relationships between
the player and the gaming operator. What Alice and Myra win
in their games, whether denominated “prize,” “payout,”
“winnings,” or “banana,” is nothing more than the right to keep
playing. All that changes is the amount of play the casino or
operator is obliged to give.247
Just as my efforts in Defender were rewarded with more
units of play in the form of new ships with which to fight the
244. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
245. See Camp, supra note 141, at 54–60 for a more in-depth treatment
of this idea.
246. See Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
247. This is different than virtual items accumulated in a virtual world.
The accumulation of those items, whether labeled “Sword of 1000 Truths” or
“Gold” changes the property rights each taxpayer has with the virtual world
operator, as I explain in some detail in The Play’s the Thing. See Camp,
supra note 141. Even in that article, I acknowledged that the realization
argument was a close one. I rejected it, however, in favor of an imputed
income argument because the virtual items, in my view, did change the set of
legal relationships between the players and the virtual world operators.
Here, in the case of skill games, that imputed income argument is also a good
one, but it does not work so well for gambling games.
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aliens, so are Alice and Myra’s efforts rewarded with more
units of play, however denominated. The fact that better or
luckier players get more play for their money puts them in the
same position as a bargain purchaser: their right to play will
vary depending on “ability and shrewdness . . . or by reason of
other influences or forces.”248 Not until Alice or Myra actually
cash out do they realize any appreciation in their property.
Critically, the appreciation in their property—their right to
play—does not meet even the Cottage Savings relaxed concept
of realization.249 There is simply no change in legal
relationships between the player and the gaming operator
(whether a casino or Worldwinner) simply because the player
accumulates more units of play in the account. The odds
remain the same, and never in their favor.
Thus, the two current approaches to taxing electronic
gaming are contrary to the doctrine of realization because both
seek to include unrealized gain as gross income. One might
raise two objections to this way of conceiving the problem of
redeemable game credits: (1) the cash equivalency doctrine;
and (2) the economic benefit doctrine.
First, if redeemable game credits were cash or the
equivalent of cash, then income would be realized when they
are credited to a player’s account, just like the interest a bank
credits to a deposit account, or the dividends earned in a
mutual fund account that are automatically reinvested into
more stock. In both of those situations, what is being credited
to the taxpayer by the bank or the mutual fund is cash or the
equivalent of cash.
What makes an item equivalent to cash is the ability of
the taxpayer to use it to purchase a wide variety of goods or
services.250 Thus, a paper check is the equivalent of cash.251
248. Geeseman v. Comm’r, 38 B.T.A. 258, 264 (1938).
249. See Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 565 (defining a realization event as
an event that changes the legal relationships between the player and gaming
operator).
250. For a good discussion of current doctrine, see Fred B. Brown,
Proposing a Single, Simpler Test for Cash Equivalency, 71 TAX LAW. 591
(2018). He proposes to define a cash equivalent as any obligation that is
readily tradable in an established securities market.
251. Kahler v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 31, 35 (1962) (holding that the receipt of
a check is the realization of income).
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Promissory notes can sometimes be the equivalent of cash, if
they are “unconditional and assignable, not subject to set-offs,
and . . . of a kind that is frequently transferred to lenders or
investors at a discount not substantially greater than the
generally prevailing premium for the use of money . . . .”252
Otherwise, they are simply evidence of a debt.253 Finally, even
the crediting of an account with redeemable service credits can
be the equivalent of cash.254
What all these cash equivalent situations have in common
is that the taxpayer receives something that not only has
ascertainable economic value, it is something the taxpayer can
use like cash. It is something that is always “reflected in a
negotiable note, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness which,
like money, commonly and readily changes hands in
commerce.”255 That means the taxpayer must be able to use
what is received to purchase a wide variety of goods and
services.256
Redeemable game credits are neither cash nor the
equivalent of cash. What is confusing are the labels.
Worldwinner and casinos label redeemable game credits using
dollar signs. In fact, as the illustration on page nine above
shows, Worldwinner likes to label redeemable game credits as
“real money.” But redeemable game credits are not like real
money because they are not something that is “like money,
commonly and readily [used] in commerce.”257 They are simply
the receipt of more units of play, an increase in the contractual
rights governing the player’s account, which is a species of
252. Cowden v. Comm’r, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961).
253. See Reed v. Comm’r, 723 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[A] cash
basis taxpayer’s contractual right to future payment must be reflected in a
negotiable note, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness which, like money,
commonly and readily changes hands in commerce.”); Williams v. Comm’r,
28 T.C. 1000, 1002 (1957).
254. See Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 CB 100 (stating that cash method
members of barter clubs realize income when amounts credited to their
accounts can be used to purchase goods or services or be transferred for value
to other members). I discuss the history of barter club taxation in The Play’s
the Thing. See Camp, supra note 141, at 30–33.
255. Reed, 723 F.2d at 147.
256. I develop this idea more fully in The Play’s the Thing. See Camp,
supra note 141, at 60–71.
257. Reed, 723 F.2d at 147.
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property. True, they can become cash if the player makes the
choice to actually redeem them. But it is only at that point in
time any income is potentially realized.
The second objection rests on the economic conception of
income. There is a common law set of tax rules, closely related
to the constructive receipt doctrine, that together make up
what is called the economic benefit doctrine.258 As typically
applied, it requires an individual to report as gross income any
economic benefit conferred upon him, to the extent that the
benefit has an ascertainable fair market value.259 It is
elementary that gross income can come in any form, whether
cash, property or services.260 When a taxpayer receives
property or services, they can be income in the amount of their
fair market value.261 Since the redeemable game credits
arguably have a fair market value, their receipt is arguably
realized income to the extent of their fair market value.
The second objection is not well taken. The economic
benefit doctrine arises from and deals with employee deferred
compensation schemes.262 The key context for application of
the economic benefit doctrine is that the taxpayer is providing
services in exchange for what is received. Treas. Reg. 1.161-2 is
even titled “Compensation for services, including fees,
commissions, and similar items.”
Neither Alice nor Myra are providing services to the game
site operators or the casinos. It is the game site operators and
casinos who are providing the gaming services. Alice and Myra
258. See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing the Promise to Pay,
89 MINN. L. REV. 1092, 1116 (2005); Patricia Ann Metzer, Constructive
Receipt, Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case Study in
Deferred Compensation, 29 TAX L. REV. 525, 550 (1974).
259. See Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 258, at 1151 (“[T]he seller realizes
compensation income to the extent of the fair market value of property
received as consideration in the sale.”).
260. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1, 1.61-2(d); see also Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 CB
100.
261. Id.
262. According to Metzer, the first Supreme Court case that articulated
the doctrine was Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), which dealt
with employee compensation. There the Court held that the legal meaning of
gross income was “broad enough to include in taxable income any economic
or financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the
form or mode by which it is effected.” Smith, 324 U.S. at 181.
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are consumers. The redeemable game credits are more like
shopping coupons in that the credits represent a discount
given by the game site operators and casinos for the gaming
services. The discounts create nothing more than bargain
purchases. When used, they represent a reduction in cost of
one particular exercise of market rights in consumption and,
hence, are not income.263
VI. Finding the Right Rule
“In theory, there is no difference between theory and
practice. But, in practice, there is.” 264
Tax law is messy. It is, as Jack Manhire so nicely says, a
wicked system.265 The messiness exists partly because tax law
shadows life and life is messy.266 It exists partly because tax
263. See Westpac Pacific Food v. Comm’r, 451 F.3d 970, 971 (9th Cir.
2006) (“Harry Homeowner goes to the furniture store, spots just the right
dining room chairs for $500 each, and says ‘I’ll take four, if you give me a
discount.’ Negotiating a 25% discount, he pays only $1,500 for the chairs. He
has not made $500, he has spent $1,500.”). What is true for purchase of
property can also be true for purchase of services. Rev. Rul. 91-36, 1991-2
C.B. 17 (explaining that credits granted to customers of an electric utility
company represented a reduction in the purchase price of electricity rather
than income).
264. Attributed to Yogi Berra, among others. See Yogi Berra, WIKIQUOTE,
https://perma.cc/S5JD-B6SQ (last updated Jan. 20, 2020) (last visited Apr. 4,
2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
265. J.T. Manhire, Tax Compliance as a Wicked System, 18 FLA. TAX REV.
235, 242 (2016)
[S]ocietal systems . . . are a type of system where complexity and
complicatedness interact and yield a different and emergent
quality. This new quality, called “wickedness,” does not lend itself
well to traditional complexity science analysis, structural systems
approaches, mathematical models, or any combination thereof.
Wickedness is something more than complexity and
complicatedness alone, and as Nobel laureate Philip Anderson
famously put it, “more is different.”
Professor Manhire is discussing in that article only the administrative aspect
of tax law. Tax compliance, however, overlays a base of tax rules which are
themselves both complex and complicated.
266. That is, tax rules do not regulate the primary behavior of taxpayers
but instead reflect the tax consequences of behavior. That is the central
reason why tax administration and rulemaking seems “exceptional” to
conventional administrative law thinkers and why tax regulations have
traditionally been viewed as “interpretative” and not “legislative” under
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rules emanate from three sources—Congress, Treasury, and
courts—in what I like to think of as a slow-moving
conversation. Those sources create complex and sometimes
conflicting rules and systems of rules and do so over time,
meaning tax law is not just messy at any moment in time but
is messy over time. Finally, the messiness comes from an
inherent and ongoing tension between economic theory and
administrative necessity, with the latter represented in this
Article by the persistence of accounting memory.
This Article’s very existence illustrates the messiness. An
existing regulation tells casinos how to satisfy their § 6041
reporting obligations. That’s a tax rule. This Article argues the
rule is wrong. At some point a taxpayer may disagree with how
the casino has reported its payments and decline to follow that
rule when reporting income. If the Service audits and the
matter goes to court, a court might create a different rule than
what is in the information reporting regulation. If so, a later
court might uphold the current rule. Or the Service will refuse
to change the current rule. Or Congress might step in and
enact a different rule. Or the Service might change the
reporting rule. In short, the messiness comes not just from
theory but also from the practical workings of tax
administration.
Professors Abreu and Greenstein offer a way out of this
messiness in two articles they published in 2011 and 2012.267
They observe that “no single rule can determine the existence
of income across the great run of human activity.”268 From that
they argue that the legal meaning of income should be
conceptualized as a standard and not a rule. They argue that
an income-as-standard approach “illuminates the treatment of
the vast majority of exchanges that occur in human
interaction. Those exchanges create wealth but implicate
important non-economic values too vast and varied for any rule
to capture.”269
conventional administrative law doctrines. Wading into that debate,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
267. Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 140, at 301–07;
Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 6, at 126.
268. Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 6, at 126.
269. Id. at 130.
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By “standard” they mean “an all-things-considered
analysis informed by the relevant tax values.”270 They
recognize that their “first order of business is to identify those
values: the things we care about when deciding whether an
accession to wealth should be [legally] treated as income.” That
makes sense. If one is going to propose a legal standard, one
needs to identify the various factors that are relevant to the
standard. They then identify various “things we care about”
including: (1) administrability; (2) taxpayer privacy; (3)
disincentives to private improvement of living standards; (4)
incentives for social cooperation; (5) horizontal equity; (6) other
things that may come up in particular fact patterns.
The idea of conceiving the § 61 tautology as a standard
rather than a rule is initially appealing. Upon closer
examination, however, I submit that the idea is not workable
in practice. And even in theory it presents a very real danger of
equating what can be taxed to what should be taxed. The
better approach is to recognize § 61 is a rule, but one subject to
complex and sometimes conflicting sub-rules.
A. Why Tax Law Should Prefer Rules over Standards
Rules can be frustrating in their rigidity with enforcement
being over-inclusive or under-inclusive, or both.271 I like the
hoary example of the speed limits, and I offer a couple of
twists. A rules approach to preventing speeding would be a
sign that says “Speed Limit 35.” Driving above that limit is
speeding and subjects one to a ticket.272 Driving below the limit
is not speeding.
Sometimes, however, a driver should really drive below
that limit, such as when hazardous road conditions make
driving 35 mph dangerous. Or if the road runs by an
elementary school, driving 35 mph may be too fast at the start
and end of school when little irrational legs dart about the
landscape. Other times, drivers might justifiably drive faster
270. Id. at 107.
271. Many commentators have explained this. I like the discussion in
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992).
272. See id. at 559–60 (“A rule may entail an advance determination of
what conduct is permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator.”).
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than 35 mph, such as when taking a badly injured person to
the hospital.
One twist to this common example is that a rules-based
system can add sub-rules to mitigate the inclusiveness
problem.273 For example, the authorities who are tasked with
administering the law might post a second speed limit sign
that says “20 mph when flashing.”274 The sign is then
programmed to flash during the start and end times of school.
This sub-rule creates an exception to the otherwise applicable
general rule imposing a 35 mph speed limit. The downside of
sub-rules is complexity.275 Drivers in congested urban areas
experience this daily when confronted with myriad such rules
and sub-rules, signs that instruct them when a lane is
one-directional, or when right turn or left turns are permitted,
or when commuter lane rules are in effect.276
Another often overlooked twist is that the actual
administration of rules and sub-rules creates additional
complexity.277 In the speed limit example, the authorities who
enforce speeding laws must rely on programmers to correctly
program the second sign. If the programmers fail to program
the correct times, or fail to account for holidays and summer,
then the 20-mph-when-flashing sub-rule adds complexity but
no value. Such failures are a byproduct of the bureaucratic
process that produces rules. My hypothetical programming
error could result from any number of communication errors in
the process of creating the sub-rule.
273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953,
962 (1995) (“Rules may be simple or complex.”).
274. See id. (“A law could say, for example, that no one under eighteen
may drive. . . . Or it could be quite complex, creating a formula for deciding
who may drive.”).
275. See id. at 992 (“The first problem with rules is that it can be very
hard to design good ones. . . . If strictly followed, the rule will often produce
arbitrariness and errors in particular cases. . . . [A]ny rule that people can
generate will produce too much inaccuracy.”).
276. See, e.g., Frequently Asked HOV Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP.
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://perma.cc/F2YD-HRMU (last updated Feb. 1,
2017) (last visited Jan. 2, 2020) (describing the complexities and variations
in HOV lanes among states) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
277. For example, I see no mention of this in Kaplow’s otherwise
excellent discussion.
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In contrast to a rules approach, authorities tasked with
administering the law forbidding speeding could use a
standards approach. A standards approach would be a sign
that says “Drive a Reasonable Speed.”278 The standard then
needs no further ex-ante modification because it is inherently
flexible, depending on a host of factors, including factors
outside the vehicle (such as what is happening around the
road, the state of the road, the weather) and factors inside the
vehicle (such as the nature of the driver’s errand, the driver’s
ability, how the driver’s ability is affected by age, disease, or
intoxication, what cargo or other persons are in the vehicle).279
Those factors would be applied on a case-by-case basis by the
enforcement authorities.
Traffic authorities prefer rules to standards. One sees this
in the plentitude of speed limit and other traffic signs.280 One
reason is practical: rules lend themselves to low-cost
enforcement, especially when administrators are faced with
high-volume enforcement needs such as regulating traffic
speed.281 A single police officer can enforce the applicable speed
limit by using a radar gun to identify and pull over speeders.
Pulling over one motorist has a cascading deterrence effect on
drivers, who see the rule actually enforced. That is because
they know the rule—don’t exceed 35 mph—and seeing it
enforced helps discipline them.282 Or a speed camera can
automatically take a picture of a speeding car’s license plate
and then generate a fine letter. While there are well-known

278. See Kaplow, supra note 271, at 560 (“A standard may entail leaving
both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the
adjudicator.”).
279. See id. (“A standard might prohibit ‘driving at an excessive speed on
expressways.’”).
280. For example, the Federal Highway Administration maintains an
800+ page manual on providing and marking traffic rules and signs. U.S.
DEPT. TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL
DEVICES FOR STREETS AND HIGHWAYS (2009), https://perma.cc/YK9J-4Q53
(PDF).
281. Kaplow highlights this practical consideration of rules being
preferable to standards. See Kaplow, supra note 271, at 563 (“[T]he
frequency of individual behavior and of adjudication is of central
importance.”).
282. Or at least they know the common law enforcement norm of
allowing a grace level of five MPH above the posted limit.
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downsides to both modes of enforcement, they do enable the
authorities to enforce the rule efficiently. Thus, even a
non-working speed camera or an empty parked police car can
enforce the law, when the law is a rule.
In contrast, standards require far more resources because
they must be applied on a case-by-case basis. Even a camera
equipped with artificial intelligence would be able only to
ascertain and account for factors external to the vehicle. A
police officer would need to stop any motorist suspected of
violating the standard of reasonable speed to inquire about the
relevant factors relating to inside the vehicle. Other motorists
would not be affected by stopped speeder because surely while
that person was unreasonable, they are not. Finally, enforcing
a standard might work for a lightly traveled road—perhaps
one in Montana—but enforcement of speeding law in highly
congested urban or suburban environments would entail huge
personnel costs.
Standards, moreover, have theoretical as well as practical
problems. Standards can also be antithetical to the rule of law.
It ain’t called the “rule” of law for nothing.283 Law—whether
expressed as rule or standards—ultimately requires physical
force to ensure that the law is obeyed. Robert Cover makes
that point in his classic “Violence and the Word.”284 The
violence part is that administration of the law imposes
tangible, physical consequences on people.285 But that iron fist
of violence is clothed in the velvet glove of words. It is the
combination of violence and words that creates the discipline
in a citizenry to obey the law.286 When the words are too fuzzy,
when they become standards, discipline drops.287
283. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (“Even in simpler times uncertainty has been
regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law.”).
284. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
285. See id. at 1601 (“Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the
imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of
a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his
children, even his life.”).
286. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (discussing
the link between systems of punishment and internalized individual
discipline). I apply this idea more broadly to tax administration in Bryan
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Speed limits are a real-world example of the dangers that
standards can pose to the rule of law. For a brief time, the
State of Montana eschewed hard speed limits and attempted to
impose a standard of “Reasonable and Prudent Speed.”288 The
Montana Supreme Court struck down the state’s attempt,
writing:
It is evident from the testimony in this case and the
arguments to the Court that the average motorist in
Montana would have no idea of the speed at which he or
she could operate his or her motor vehicle on this State’s
highways without violating Montana’s “basic rule” based
simply on the speed at which he or she is traveling.
Furthermore, the basic rule not only permits, but requires
the kind of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that
the due process clause in general, and the void-forvagueness doctrine in particular, are designed to prevent. It
impermissibly delegates the basic public policy of how fast
is too fast on Montana’s highways to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.289

Tax law is currently implemented by a range of legal tools:
from rules to standards to principles to guidelines to forms to

Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1
(2004).
287. See Nicholas Georgakopoulos, The Vagueness of Limits and the
Desired Distribution of Conducts, 32 CONN. L. REV. 451 (2000) (reviewing the
standard literature).
288. State v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132 (Mont. 1998). The operative statute
at that time provided that motorists had to drive “in a careful and prudent
manner” and that was reflected on posted signs as “reasonable and prudent.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-303 (1996). One can still see a picture on this
website, which lists what the author believes are the most ridiculous speed
limit signs in the U.S.: Travis Okulski, The Most Ridiculous Speed Limits,
JALOPNIK (Nov. 11, 2012, 11:00 AM), https://perma.cc/58H4-V58W (last
visited Jan. 2, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
289. Stanko, 974 P.2d at 1137 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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computer coding.290 It is, however, mostly a set of rules. Tax
administrators prefer rules.291
For example, Section 469 is a mix of standards and rules.
It prohibits a taxpayer from deducting losses arising from
“passive activities.”292 A passive activity is any trade or
business in which the taxpayer does not “materially
participate.”293 Section 469(h)(1) then says: “A taxpayer shall
be treated as materially participating in an activity only if the
taxpayer is involved in the operations of the activity on a basis
which is—(A) regular, (B) continuous, and (C) substantial.”
Here, Congress created a standard, giving an undefined
set of relevant considerations. This standard is a particularly
“soft” standard, to use Lawrence Solum’s typology.294 It gives
taxpayers more hope than guidance and must be entirely
enforced ex post.
Tax administrators reacted to the statutory standard by
issuing a regulation that imposes a set of hard rules and
sub-rules. Treasury Regulation 1.469-5T(a) says that a
taxpayer is deemed to materially participate if the taxpayer
meets any one of seven conditions.295 The first six are rules,
such as the first one that says a taxpayer materially
290. For a nuanced typology, see Sunstein, supra note 273. I explore how
forms function as legal rules in: Bryan T. Camp, The Function of Forms, 110
TAX NOTES 531 (2006); Bryan T. Camp, The Never-Ending Battle, 111 TAX
NOTES 373 (2006); and Bryan T. Camp, The Function of Forms in the
Substitute-for-Return Process, 111 TAX NOTES 1511 (2006).
291. See ASS’N OF INT’L CERTIFIED PROF. ACCOUNTANTS, GUIDING
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD TAX POLICY: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING TAX
PROPOSALS 7 (2017) (“Certainty is important to a tax system . . . [and]
generally comes from clear statutes as well as timely and understandable
administrative guidance.”).
292. § 469(a).
293. § 469(c)(1).
294. Legal Theory Lexicon 026: Rules, Standards, Principles, Catalogs,
and Discretion, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, https://perma.cc/TZ6H-UMFM (last
updated Sept. 29, 2019) (last visited Jan. 3, 2020) (“Some standards give the
decision maker substantial guidance, by specifying relatively specific and
concrete factors the decision maker should consider and the relative weight
or importance of those factors. Other standards are much more open ended,
requiring consideration of factors that are general and abstract.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
295. Treas. Reg. § 1.469–5T (1996).
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participates if they spend more than 500 hours in the activity
during the year. Even if a taxpayer spends less time than that,
the regulations provide that the taxpayer will be deemed to
materially participate if the taxpayer has spent more than 100
hours in the activity during the year and no one else has spent
more time. The seventh condition just repeats the statutory
standard and is the catch-all.296 However, because the first six
rules (and attendant sub-rules) are so complete, it is difficult to
imagine any set of facts that will fit the standard when a
taxpayer cannot meet any of the first six rules. In this way, the
tax administrators have cabined the standard with rules.297
Section 61 states a definition of “gross income” as income
from any source, but does not define “income.” Glenshaw Glass
provides that, as a general rule, the legal meaning of the word
“income” in Section 61 is “accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion.”298
Professors Abreu and Greenstein propose to reconceive the
legal meaning of income as standard-based and not
rule-based.299 In an important sense their proposal is
shadowboxing. That is, they observe that “no single rule can
determine the existence of income across the great run of

296. § 1.469–5T(a)(7) (“[A]n individual shall be treated . . . as materially
participating in an activity for the taxable year if . . . [b]ased on all of the
facts and circumstances . . . the individual participates in the activity on a
regular, continuous, and substantial basis.”).
297. I believe the regulations that define the term “material
participation” as used in Section 469 support Professor Nicholas
Georgakopoulos’s thesis in The Vagueness of Limits and the Desired
Distribution of Conducts, supra note 287. There, Professor Georgakopoulos
posits that while most scholars believe that “the choice of vagueness [is] a
determinant of the distribution of conducts,” id. at 454, in fact “[t]he actual
concentrating effect of precision depends on the distribution of preferences in
the population as well as on the location of the limit,” id. at 461. The choices
of 500 and 100 hours illustrate at least the tax administrators’ judgment of
the desired distribution. I am unaware, however, of any empirical work on
the effectiveness of that choice. A fuller explanation of this is beyond the
scope of this Article.
298. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
299. See Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 140, at 339
(“The Glenshaw Glass definition of income has the appearance of a rule but
is actually a standard.”).
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human activity.”300 I know of no one who would dispute that
statement.
The legal meaning of income, however, is not a single rule.
The Glenshaw Glass formulation is itself a synthesis of many
smaller, well-defined, instances of income: wages, gains from
sale of property, interest, rents, royalties, dividends, pensions,
cancellation of debt, etc., all of which are listed as items of
income in Section 61. And those instances of income are
themselves general rules, subject to myriad exceptions. The
legal meaning of income is not simply the single rule given in
Glenshaw Glass, but is instead a system of rules and
sub-rules— rules created by Congress, the Service, and the
courts—that together do indeed reflect “the existence of income
across the great run of human activity.”301 Professors Abreu
and Greenstein’s project would be better served if they
explained how their proposal integrates with this system of
rules.
On the merits, if we take their proposal seriously, it has
multiple downsides. First is deciding what guidance to give
taxpayers, who must report their income each year. Treating
income as governed by a general rule enables taxpayers to
generally know what to report and enables administrators to
give them useful guidance. For example, the Form 1040
Instructions tell taxpayers what to report on each line of the
form, tracking the general list of items enumerated in Section
61.302 Thus, it tells taxpayers to report “the total of your wages,
salaries, tips, etc.” on line 1, and then gives additional rules on
what that means.303 For many of the lines, the Instructions tell
the taxpayer to report to the IRS the same amounts that are
reported to them on various forms, such as Form 1099-INT for
interest payments reported on line 2, Form 1099-DIV for
dividends received, reported on line 3, etc.304
300. Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 6, at 126.
301. Id.
302. INTERNAL REV. SERV., IRS 1040 Instructions 2018 Tax Year (2019)
https://perma.cc/RQ76-S52G (PDF).
303. Id. at 26.
304. See id. at 14 (instructing filers to report tax-exempt interest from
box 8 of Form 1099-INT on line 2a of Form 1040); id. at 13 (instructing filers
to report items from box 1a of Form 1099-DIV on line 3b of Form 1040).
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The current Instructions are able to give accurate
guidance only because the legal meaning of income is a general
rule, modified by a googolplex of sub-rules. If the legal
meaning of income was instead a standard it would, by
definition, be determined with reference only to “the things we
care about.” The instructions would be much simpler, just as a
traffic sign that says “Reasonable and Prudent” is simpler than
multiple signs giving rules and sub-rules. The simplified
instructions might tell the taxpayer to “report as income those
amounts you believe should be reported as income considering
the various factors of administrability (which to a taxpayer
means audit lottery), your privacy, the disincentives to private
improvement that reporting the item as income would give
you, the incentives for social cooperation that not reporting the
item would give you, your belief that others like you are
reporting similar items, and any other factor you think is
relevant to deciding whether to report the amounts as income.”
Equally importantly, the Service would need to tell payors to
report only those payments the payors reasonably believed
needed to be reported.
To the extent that one believes the Instructions could stay
the same under an income-as-standard approach, then one is
not really taking Professors Abreu and Greenstein’s proposal
seriously. Their proposal becomes simply the identification of
policy reasons that would support exceptions to the general
rule that income is any realized accretion of wealth. That is
nothing new. It is how the law already works. There is no
statutory definition of “income.” There are statutory definitions
of “gross income” and “adjusted gross income” and “taxable
income.”305 But the definition of “income” is a set of common
law rules, created by court decisions such as Glenshaw Glass,
that interpret the statutory term. And, as I discussed above as
well as in a prior article, the common law rules do reflect
consideration of all the “things we care about.”306
The second downside is an irony. Treating the legal
meaning of income as a standard actually untethers taxation
from the very things “we” care about. Professors Abreu and
Greenstein claim “[t]he definition of income is most aptly
305.
306.

§ 61, § 62, § 63.
See Camp, supra note 141.
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analyzed not as a rule but as a standard.”307 But analyzed by
whom? The use of passive voice hides the legal actor. The first
legal actors to define income in our system of taxation are
taxpayers who make their annual return.308 Taxpayers likely
value their privacy more than they value contributing to the
common fisc or making tax administration efficient.
Administrators likely value efficiency over incentives for social
cooperation or privacy.
In other words, the values embodied in Professor Abreu
and Greenstein’s indeterminate list of factors will inevitably
collide. They freely acknowledge this but write “[c]olliding
values require choosing which values will prevail in any given
case, and . . . that is something that can only be accomplished
by deploying a standard.”309 Again, note the passive voice. One
gets to the things “we” care about only in an ex post procedure
where a neutral party weighs the factors. Until then, the legal
actor defining income is either the taxpayer or the Service and
will make the definition favoring the things that either the
taxpayer or the tax administrator cares about.
In short, bringing theoretical cohesion to treating income
as a standard requires a different system of administering
taxes. The system requires a neutral decision-maker to put the
multiple colliding factors together. That would require 150
million trials per year. The Tax Court currently carries a
docket of about 20,000.310 Had it words enough, and time,
income-as-a-standard would be no crime.
307. Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 6, at 126.
308. Many, including judges, politicians, and commentators, erroneously
describe the U.S. tax system as one of “self-assessment.” See, e.g., J.T.
Manhire, What Does Voluntary Tax Compliance Mean?: A Government
Perspective, 164 UNIV. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE 11, 11 (2015) (“In most
congressional reports, the IRS emphasizes voluntary taxpayer compliance as
a foundational principle of the U.S. tax system.”). What is accurate is to say
that the U.S. tax system is one of self-reporting. See id. at 15 (“[The IRS]
relies on individual taxpayers to accurately assess their own tax liability on
annual returns and timely pay the correct amount due.”). I explain the
significant error inherent in the “self-assessment” conception in Bryan
Camp, “Loving” Tax Return Preparer Regulation, 140 TAX NOTES 457 (2013).
309. Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 6, at 109.
310. The most recent data is still from HAROLD DUBROFF & BRANT J.
HELLWIG, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 909 (2d
ed. 2014), https://perma.cc/B55M-FD3U (PDF) (listing Tax Court caseload
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Even assuming a system design where the standards
approach requires only the same number of trials as yearly
field audits—some 250,000 in 2018311—the proposal to treat
income as a standard through the use of multiple conflicting
indeterminate factors is a dubious proposition. Certainly the
tax law contains many areas where courts and regulations
have created indeterminate multi-factor tests.312 An example
in the regulations is the test for determining whether a
taxpayer’s activity is really for profit or just for fun.313
Professors Abreu and Greenstein discuss another: the common
law test for when receipt of a payment in a business context
can be excluded from income as a gift.314
Just because multi-factor tests exist does not make them
desirable. Perhaps the most famous take-down is Judge
Posner’s in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner.315 That case
involved the multi-factor common law test the Tax Court used
(and still uses) to determine the amount a corporation could
deduct as reasonable compensation to its officers.316 While

deficiency in 2013 as 30,046). The table covers the years between 1990 and
2013 and breaks down the Tax Court workload into the following categories:
Deficiency; Collection Due Process; Innocent Spouse Stand-Alone;
Partnership Actions; and Other. Id.
311. INTERNAL REV. SERV., IRS DATA BOOK TABLE 9A, https://perma.cc
/TVU2-V4PM (PDF) (listing a total of 249,768 Field Examinations of tax
returns in Fiscal Year 2018).
312. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (listing
ten factors for determining whether a person is an employee), with Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) (listing thirteen
factors), and Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (offering a list of twenty
factors).
313. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972) (creating a nine-factor test).
314. See Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 140, at
111–13 (“The Lawyer retains the Doctor’s services, but, after the Doctor
performs the surgery, he tells the Lawyer that he won’t charge her because
of their friendship. . . . The Lawyer would not have income because the
Doctor has made the Lawyer a gift and section 102 excludes gifts from
income.”).
315. 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999).
316. See id. at 834–35 (“It is apparent that this test, though it or its
variants (one of which has the astonishing total of 21 factors . . . ), are
encountered in many cases, . . . leaves much to be desired—being, like many
other multi-factor tests, ‘redundant, incomplete, and unclear.’” (citations
omitted)).
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Posner was excoriating that particular test, scholars have
generalized his critique.317
One of the inherent risks of a multi-factor test is its
indeterminacy. As Posner notes: “since the test cannot itself
determine the outcome of a dispute because of its nondirective
character, it invites the making of arbitrary decisions based on
uncanalized discretion or unprincipled rules of thumb.”318
Applying that critique here, the chief problem with the
multi-factor test proposed by Professors Abreu and Greenstein
is that it risks being dominated by one factor as a rule of
thumb: administrability.
Consider how administrability affects the taxation of cash
gaming. If Alice and Myra are playing each game with cash,
then the per-transaction rule is the theoretically correct rule
under an income-as-rule approach. For example, if Myra puts
$2.50 in the slot machine, pulls the handle and out drops $6.00
in quarters, Myra has realized income of $3.50. Myra can use
that $3.50 to do anything that $3.50 can do: buy a Starbucks
coffee, buy a burger, buy a beer, buy a kitchen utensil, buy
most anything at Dollar Tree. So in theory it is income. But
odds are that Myra will scoop up that $3.50 and drop it all
back in the machines. And she will do so before anyone notices,
so it remains a private decision.
The Service has traditionally declined to tax each $3.50.
Both it and the courts have long recognized the administrative
difficulties of tracking the basis of each wager individually in a
session of like play.319 Under Professor Abreu and Greenstein’s
approach, one would weigh and balance the factors of privacy
and administrability and whatever else are “things we care
about” to decide that the $3.50 is simply not income. Then one
would need to go through the same exercise with every other
gambler. I warrant the balance comes out in favor of saying
the $3.50 is not income.

317. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Posner on Tax: The Independent Investor
Test, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2019) (“In this Essay, I endorse Posner’s
devastating rejection of a tax law multifactor test in Exacto Spring Corp.”).
318. Exacto Corp., 196 F.3d at 835.
319. See, e.g., Szkircsak v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1980) (“[I]t is
impractical to record each separate roll of the dice or spin of the wheel.”).
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The Service, however, takes pains to create a rule of law
by interpreting the text that Congress wrote in Section 165(d)
to allow the $3.50 to be netted against all other similar gaming
activity in a single session.320 The Service approaches the
problem by looking at the words in a statute and deciding the
better of two legal meanings.321 So while administrability
drives the legal meaning, the result is a rule that applies to all
taxpayers. The wheel has been invented. Individual privacy
preferences are irrelevant.
When Myra opens an electronic gaming account, the
Service’s rule is unchanged, because the statute remains
unchanged. However, I submit that now both the privacy and
administrability factors cut the other way. Now every win of
$3.50 can be individually tracked, and Myra knows that the
casino knows. The per-transaction approach is now eminently
feasible to administer. Ironically, however, it is now
theoretically wrong, for the reasons I give above. And the
Service’s per-session rule also becomes theoretically wrong for
those same reasons.
Truly, Abreu and Greenstein are spot-on in recognizing
the messiness of tax law. The better approach to that
messiness, however, is not to abandon rules but to create
better sub-rules. Thus this Article: we must find a better rule
for taxation of electronic gaming, locate that rule within the
legal meaning of income, and tie that rule to the statutory
language created by Congress, the language in which is
contained the full force of the state.

320. INTERNAL REV. SERV., GLAM 208-011 (Dec. 12, 2008)
[U]nder that reading [of the statute], a taxpayer would have to
calculate the gain or loss on every transaction separately and treat
every play or wager as a taxable event. The gambler would also
have to trace and recompute the basis through all transactions to
calculate the result of each play or wager. Courts considering that
reading have found it unduly burdensome and unreasonable.
Moreover, the statute uses the plural term “transactions” implying
that gain or loss may be calculated over a series of separate plays
or wagers.
321. See id. (“Some would contend that transaction means every single
play in a game of change or every wager made. . . . The better view is that a
casual gambler, such as the taxpayer who plays the slot machine, recognizes
gain or loss at the time she redeems her tokens.”).
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B. The Right Rule: No Gross Income Until Cash-Out
Alice and Myra have a third option for how to report
income from their gaming activities: report only those amounts
that they have actually withdrawn from their player account
during the year that exceed the amounts they have put into
their player account. Thus, Myra would have no “gains from
wagering transactions” when a winning slot machine pull is
reflected only in her player’s account with the casino. Nor
would Alice have any income simply because she wins an
online game and receives redeemable game credits in her
account. Only when Alice or Myra cashes out during the year
more than what they have put in the account would they have
reportable gains. The rule would not require income to be
reported until either Alice or Myra receives cash or cash
equivalent from the casino or casual game site operator in such
form as can be spent outside the casino or the casual game
website. Because losses would already be reflected in the
account’s balance at the time of redemption, there would be no
need for players to keep track of the myriad individual game
results. Players would need only to track deposits and
withdrawals from the account, information that casinos and
website operators could easily provide.
1. Cash-Out Solves the Practical and Theoretical Problems
A cash-out rule solves the practical problem. By defining
“income” as only that which a player redeems for cash or
cash-equivalent, it reduces the pressure on taxpayers to
pretend to be in a business. What counts as wagering gains or
losses now includes the netting process inherent in the player’s
account. The practical ability of Worldwinner or a casino to
track a player’s deposits and withdrawals from an account
makes it easy to determine which withdrawals are a return of
capital and which represent income for the annual accounting
period.
A cash-out rule also solves the theoretical problem. It
respects the persistence of accounting memory and the role of
accounting concepts in shaping the legal definition of income.
The value of Alice and Myra’s property—their right to
play— increases only by dint of their own efforts and not by
any market transactions where they provide goods or services
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to another in exchange for something of value. Put another
way, their success in either the casino or the website results
simply in more units of play, unless and until they cash out.
True, their units of play are represented by “play” currency
and not Defender ships. But like Defender ships, the play
currency cannot be used to buy a market basket of goods and
services until it is cashed out. It can only be used to consume
more games. Thus, the units of play are neither cash nor
realized income until such time as they are actually converted
into something that can be used as cash.
2. Cash-Out Rule Is Better than an Above the Line Deduction
Congress could fix the problem of electronic gaming by
allowing deductions of wagering losses and hobby expenses
above the line. Moving loss deductions above the line would
take the pressure off taxpayers to pretend they are in the
“business” of gambling when, in reality, they do it for fun or
because they are addicted. That is a good result.
A cash-out rule is superior to moving the deduction for two
reasons. First, moving the deduction still requires taxpayers to
report as income redeemable tax credits either per-transaction
or per-session, and thus continues to do violence to the
accounting concepts of taxable year and realization. While
moving the deduction solves a good bit of the practical
problems, the continued use of the per-transaction or
per-session rules would continue the theoretical error of
counting unrealized gain in property as income.
Second, a cash-out rule can be implemented
administratively. The odds of Congress making any fix are less
than hitting a million-dollar jackpot on a single pull. In
contrast, the Service can change its interpretation of the
relevant statutes governing the reporting requirements of
casinos and website operators and Section 165(d).
It can easily create a new Notice or CCA to explain how
the cash-out rule is consistent with the statutory language in
Section 165(b) for the same reasons as the per-session rule: the
statutory use of the plural “transactions.”322 CCA 2008-11
focuses on the statutory use of the plural to conclude that the
322. See § 165(d) (“Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed
only to the extent of the gains from such transactions.”).
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set of wagering “transactions” within a session can be
netted.323 Nothing in the statutory language, however, limits
the impact of the plural to a twenty-four hour session. With
electronic gaming “transactions” may occur over a longer time
period than one day, one month, or one year. The concept of a
“session” comes from the underlying fact pattern in the CCA
involving the use of physical tokens.324 But the CCA’s bottom
line can just as easily be framed in terms of redeemable game
credits. It just needs to say that “fluctuating wins and losses
left in play are not accessions to wealth until the taxpayer
redeems her [game credits] and can definitively calculate the
amount above or below basis realized.”
VII. Conclusion
Casinos and website operators want their customers to
feel good about spending money. By eliminating the use of
cash, casinos make it easy for gamblers to forget how much
they are spending. The only way to get winnings is to visit the
cage or cashier, places that are deliberately designed to make
it difficult to cash out. As one website puts it: “Casinos make it
easy for you to play, but not easy for you to walk away.”325
Websites such as Worldwinner accomplish the same result by
labeling redeemable game credits as “real money.” That makes
players feel good even as they continue to play until their “real
money” runs out and they top up with a credit card.
This Article’s thesis has been that these illusions of real
money propagated by casinos and websites are not income
within the legal meaning of that term. They are nothing more
than units of play, just like the extra ships I won in Defender.
The fact that these game credits are redeemable does not affect
323. See CCA 2008-011 (Dec. 12, 2008) (“We think that the fluctuating
wins and losses left in play are not accessions to wealth until the taxpayer
redeems her tokens and can definitively calculate the amount above or below
the basis (the wager) realized.”).
324. See INTERNAL REV. SERV., GLAM 208-011 (Dec. 12, 2008) (“On each
visit to the casino, the taxpayer exchanged $100 of cash for $100 in slot
machine tokens and used the tokens to gamble.”).
325. The Top 12 Casino Psychology Tricks Used on Players, VEGAS
MASTER, https://perma.cc/884Q-MZ7D (last visited Jan. 4, 2020) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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the analysis because of the two accounting concepts that
persist in the legal meaning of income: the annual accounting
period, and the realization requirement. The law should not be
distracted by these illusions into making website operators
report the credits as payments or prizes or make taxpayers
report them as gross income.

